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 THE ARCHITECTURE OF CHARITIES= COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES 
 STRUCTURAL REACTIONS: BASIC STRUCTURES* 
 Stephen Schwarz** 
 University of California, Hastings College of the Law 
 
 I.  INTRODUCTION 
The diverse assortment of organizations that share the label "nonprofit" are said to 
inhabit a Asector@ of American society, variously described as "charitable," "tax-exempt," 
"independent," "voluntary," "philanthropic," and the "third" sector.1  A common 
assumption underlying this cluttered and often misleading terminology is that nonprofit 
organizations play a role in American society distinct from government and the for-profit 
sector.  And so they do B most of the time.  These special characteristics have influenced 
the evolution of a body of law that brings both stricter government regulation and 
generous tax benefits, especially for "charitable"2 nonprofits.    
The government, for-profit and nonprofit sectors do not exist in separate orbits.  
They overlap considerably, and the boundaries have been blurring for years.  As 
traditional sources from government and private philanthropy declined as a percentage of 
total revenue, fiscally squeezed nonprofits entered the marketplace.  It is now well known 
that, as a group (and thus the statistics are misleading), charitable organizations in the 
United States derive the bulk of their support from fees, dues, service charges, and other 
 
**Parts of this paper have been adapted from other works of the author, including James J. Fishman & 
Stephen Schwarz, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2006); Stephen Schwarz, 
Rethinking Nonprofit Joint Ventures (unpublished manuscript 2006); and Stephen Schwarz, Federal Income 
Taxation of Investments by Nonprofit Organizations: Beyond a Primer (National Center on Philanthropy and 
the Law, 2000), available at http:// www1.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/libframe.html. 
 
1See generally LESTER M. SALAMON, AMERICA'S NONPROFIT SECTOR: A PRIMER (2d ed. 1999). 
 
2The term "charitable" is used throughout this paper in its broadest tax law sense, encompassing the other 
' 501(c)(3) exempt purposes such as religion, education, science and the like.  For convenience, qualified 
' 501(c)(3) organizations will be referred to as "charities." 
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types of program-service income.  In 2005, the last year for which reliable data is 
available, private contributions accounted for only 12.3 percent of total revenue of public 
charities that filed Form 990 information returns, as compared to 70.3 percent from fees 
for services and goods, 9 percent from government, and 8.3 percent from investment 
income and miscellaneous sources.3   It is reasonable to assume that most of this program 
service income comes from activities linked to an organization's (broadly defined) mission. 
 Familiar examples include tuition, charges for health care and other "exempt function" 
services, admission fees, or income from "substantially related" activities such as gift shops, 
bookstores, and hospital pharmacies.   Some of this nondonative revenueCthe precise 
amount is unknownCcomes from Acommercial@ activity having little or no relationship to 
the organization's core mission other than, perhaps, to cross-subsidize charitable programs. 
  
The legal structures vary for these profit-seeking pursuits.   The most 
straightforward approach is to conduct the activity directly and report the revenue as 
program-service income.  In other settings, charities employ wholly owned corporate 
subsidiaries or limited liability companies, or they engage in joint ventures with for-profit 
firms or private individuals either through formal entity structures or contractual 
relationships such as licensing agreements, research alliances, corporate sponsorships, 
ground leases, and the like.  In describing these developments, interested observers have 
identified a pattern of commercialization and competition4 that is contributing to a 
convergence of the sectors.5  This is not a new phenomenon, but the dynamics have 
changed.  More than 50 years ago, with the introduction of higher and more progressive 
 
3KENNETH T. WING, THOMAS H. POLLAK & AMY BLACKWOOD, THE NEW NONPROFIT ALMANAC 2008, 143-
148 (2008).  These statistics are skewed by inclusion of health care and educational institutions, which derive 
the bulk of their substantial support from program service revenue. 
 
4See generally TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT 
SECTOR (Burton A. Weisbrod, ed., 1998). 
 
5See, e.g., J. Gregory Dees & Beth Battle Anderson, Sector-Bending : Blurring Lines Between Nonprofit and 
For-Profit, SOCIETY 16 (May/June 2003); Frances R. Hill, Targeting Exemption for Charitable Efficiency:  
Designing a Nondiversion Constraint, 56 SMU L. REV. 675 (2003); Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: 
The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
457 (1996). 
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income tax rates, investigative journalists began warning that universities, churches and a 
handful of other charities were being used as tax shelters for business profits.6   These 
uncharitable-like activities were seen as threatening the traditional Agood works@ rationale 
of tax exemption.  Congress eventually responded by enacting the unrelated business 
income tax (AUBIT@) and denying tax exemption to Afeeder corporations,@ which 
previously had been granted exemption on the ground that all their profits were destined 
for use by one or more specific charities.7  At the same time, the UBIT, supposedly aimed 
at unfair competition and protection of the corporate tax base, preserved tax exemption 
for income from businesses that were substantially related to an organization=s exempt 
purposes even if they competed with for-profit firms and had substantial net income.8  
Despite statements in the legislative history, a meticulous review of the UBIT=s origins 
suggests that unfair competition was not the primary motivation for taxing unrelated 
business income.  As Professor Ethan Stone has concluded, a more historically accurate 
 
6Benjamin Fine, University Dollars Yielding Tax-Free Business Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1948, at A1.  See 
also The Abuse of Tax Exemption: It Has Got to the Point Where Something Has to Be Done About It, 
FORTUNE, May 1950, at 74. 
 
7Very generally, a feeder is an organization (usually a corporation) operated for the primary purpose of 
carrying on a trade or business for profit.  A corporation that manufactured and sold salad dressing and 
distributed its net profits to a designated charity is an example of a feeder.  Under ' 502, a feeder will not 
qualify for tax exemption on the ground that all its profits are payable to one or more ' 501 organizations.   
Section 502 was enacted to overturn the destination of income test that permitted feeders to qualify as tax-
exempt.  See, e.g., C.F. Mueller v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1951).  For a rare recent case 
denying exemption to a feeder, see CRSO v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 153 (2007), involving a nonprofit 
corporation that as its sole activity rented out two parcels of debt-financed commercial real estate and 
distributed the net proceeds to a charity named in its charter. 
 
8More than fifty years of history, experience and endless discussion have not yielded much more than 
speculation as to whether the stated goals of the UBIT are coherent and, if unfair competition is the culprit, 
whether the current structure of the tax provides a satisfactory solution.  A familiar lament is the lack of any 
empirical data validating the supposed evils of unfair competition.  Periodically, questions are raised as to 
whether the "trade or business" and "relatedness" tests are appropriate to police inappropriate commercial 
behavior.  The assumption that nonprofit organizations would compete unfairly in their active "business" 
pursuits without the UBIT, but pose no competitive threat when investing their endowment, renting their 
real estate, or exploiting their intellectual capital is accepted but lacks a rigorous explanation.  Some 
academic commentary has called for repeal of the UBIT, while others question whether unfair competition is 
even relevant, preferring to shift the inquiry to economic efficiency and protection of the corporate income 
tax base.  See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Tax, 75 VA. L. REV. 
605 (1989); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 
1017 (1982). 
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explanation may be political symbolism B i.e., the function of the UBIT was to deter 
charities from engaging in activities that look bad.9   
As it approaches its 60th birthday, the UBIT, with its porous standards, specialized  
exceptions, and opportunities for strategic allocation of expenses, has evolved into a 
modest tax exemption border patrol sentry B a dog with more bark than bite, almost a 
voluntary tax.10  The UBIT influences how charities structure or Aspin@ their business 
activities but it has not stunted their growth.  Headlines appear at regular intervals 
describing the slick museum shops at suburban shopping malls;11 the "kept" University, 
with its profitable research alliances with drug companies and exclusive sponsorship and 
provider arrangements for athletic gear, soft drinks, credit cards, alumni cabernet;, and 
stadium and even dean naming rights;12 cause-related marketing deals;13 Ben and Jerry=s 
 
9See Ethan Stone, Adhering to the Old Line: Uncovering the History and Political Function of the Unrelated 
Business Income Tax, 54 EMORY L. J. 1475 (2005).  Professor Stone found few complaints about unfair 
competition in the history preceding enactment of the UBIT and concluded that Congress was responding 
more to the use of charities by for-profit businesses as tax shelter facilitators. 
 
10See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND 
REGULATION 295 (2004).  The author came to this conclusion independently but notes that it was among the 
themes of a November 1999 conference at the Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations at Harvard where 
the topic was: "The Unrelated Business Income Tax: The Dog That Doesn't Bite."  Statistics confirm this 
suspicion.  Slightly more than half of the 38,040 exempt organizations (including pension trusts) filing Form 
990-T tax returns in 2004 (the latest year for which data is available) reported zero taxable income or a 
deficit.  About 25 percent of the total UBIT tax liability of $367.7 million in 2004 was paid by pension trusts 
and ' 501(c)(9) voluntary employee beneficiary associations on investment income.  Although ' 501(c)(3) 
organizations accounted for about one-third  of total returns filed, only 37.7 percent paid any tax, and those 
organizations reported a collective gross income of $5.5 billion but collectively paid only about $192 million 
of tax.  The major sources of gross unrelated business income of ' 501(c)(3) organizations were profits from 
sales and services and advertising, followed by investment income from partnerships and S corporations, and 
debt-financed income.  Margaret Riley, Unrelated Business Income Tax Returns, 2004, IRS STATISTICS OF 
INCOME BULLETIN (Winter 2008).   See also Peter Panepento & Grant Williams, A Question of Calculation: 
Most Charity Businesses Manage to Avoid Paying Federal Taxes, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 7, 2008, at 33 
(reporting that of 91 large charities scrutinized, 51 percent reported zero or negative taxable income and 
were able to reduce $419.1 of gross income to a collective $3 million deficit after allocation of deductions).  
The largest tax bill was paid by New York=s Metropolitan Museum of Art, with total tax owed of $8.1 
million on partnership investments, other business services, and retail sales.  Id. 
 
11See, e.g. Helmut K. Anheier & Stefan Toepler, Commerce and the Muse: Are Art Museums Becoming 
Commercial?, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT? THE COMMERCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT 
SECTOR 233-248 (Burton A. Weisbrod, ed. 1998). 
 
12See, e.g., DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION (2003); JENNIFER WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY, INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION (2005); DAVID L. KIRP, SHAKESPEARE, EINSTEIN AND THE BOTTOM LINE: THE MARKETING OF 
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ice cream franchises operated by job training centers; films and exhibits developed by 
entertainment and technology companies at nonprofit museums;14 campus hotels and 
other real estate developments;15 nonprofit credit counseling agencies that are 
indistinguishable from commercial businesses;16 and the commercialization of venerable 
nonprofit elders such as the Educational Testing Service,17 the National Geographic 
Society,18 the Nature Conservancy,19 the Smithsonian Institution20, and the National 
Wildlife Federation,21 to name just a few.   
 
HIGHER EDUCATION (2003); Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 
(March 1, 2000).  On stadium and dean naming rights, two examples will suffice.  The principal indoor 
athletic venue at Arizona State University, once known as the University Activities Center, is now Wells 
Fargo Arena.  The dean of the Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley, once 
known as the Dean, is now the BankAmerica Dean.  With the consolidation of financial services firms and 
banks, these monograms are unlikely to last in perpetuity. 
 
13"Cause branding" deals are designed to leverage each participant's image and reputation with the dual goals 
of selling products and raising revenue to support the charity's mission.   
14See Anna Wilde Mathews, Entertainment Companies Aim to Thrill Museum Throngs, WALL ST. JOURNAL, 
Nov. 25, 2002, at B1; The Whitney Museum and Intel Announce Innovative Collaboration to Greatly 
Enhance the Ways People Experience and Learn About Art, BUSINESS WIRE, Sept. 24, 1998. 
 
15See Maureen Milford, A University Tries Its Hand at a For-Profit Hotel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2004. 
 
16See Jennifer Bayot, Not-for-Profit Credit Counselors Are Targets of an I.R.S. Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 
2003, at A1; Statement of Hon. Mark Everson, Testimony Before Senate Finance Committee (April 5, 2005), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/metest040505.pdf.  Tax exemptions for credit counseling 
organizations are now regulated by detailed statutory requirements.  I.R.C. ' 501(q).   
 
17Tamar Lewin, Testing Group Ends Effort to Make Profit on Web Site, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2003, at C2 
(reporting on the Educational Testing Service's diversified corporate structure and the related College Board's 
decision to abandon a commercial online venture). 
 
18Jane Levere, National Geographic Buys Stake in iExplore, N.Y.TIMES, Aug. 21, 2000, at C1. 
 
19David B. Ottaway & Joe Stephens, Nonprofit Land Bank Amasses Billions, WASH. POST, May 4, 2003, at 
A01; Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, How a Bid to Save a Specifies Came to Grief, WASH. POST, May 5, 
2003, at A01; Joe Stephens & David B. Ottaway, Nonprofit Sells Scenic Acreage to Allies at a Loss, WASH. 
POST, May 6, 2003, at A01. 
 
20See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Smithsonian-Showtime Deal Raises Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 2006, at 
A11; Jacqueline Trescott, Smithsonian Investigating Its Sales Division's Salaries, WASH. POST, April 19, 2006, 
at C01; Edward Wyatt, House Panel Challenges Smithsonian, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2006, at A14. 
 
21Elizabeth Schwinn, Constructing a Marketing Deal: Home Depot Venture Could be a Sign of the Future, 
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Aug. 7, 2003, at 24 (describing an arrangement under which Home Depot stores 
will offer "backyard habitat" products bearing the national Wildlife Federation's logo).   
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The sector-bending trend cuts both ways.  For-profit firms have staged their own 
competitive march into traditional nonprofit turf.  The most obvious example is the 
emergence and, in some markets, domination of for-profit hospitals and clinics.  For-profit 
companies also have become major players in online education, hospice care, day care, 
affordable housing, rehabilitation services, and even social welfare and charitable giving 
through donor-advised funds.22  The Apollo Group, a large publicly traded for-profit 
education company that operates the University of Phoenix, had $2.3 billion in gross 
revenue in 2005 and 315,350 enrolled students.23  Law students who wish to receive their 
J.D. online can now enroll at for-profit Concord Law School, a subsidiary of the Kaplan 
educational empire.  Where historically for-profit firms complained about unfair 
competition from tax-favored nonprofits, now nonprofits that have long enjoyed a 
monopoly are concerned about for-profit companies shrinking their market share. 
A byproduct of the "new commercialism" is the active encouragement of a culture 
of social entrepreneurship.24  This admirable-sounding movement has been promoted by a 
coalition of wealthy, mostly younger, "venture philanthropists" and their academic 
concierges who oversee programs at elite business schools and public policy centers.  
Prototypes include the National Center on Nonprofit Enterprise,25 the Harvard Business 
 
22See Dees & Anderson, supra note 5; Lester M. Salamon, THE RESILIENT SECTOR: THE STATE OF NONPROFIT 
AMERICA (2003). Examples include the Edison Schools, the University of Phoenix, Nobel Learning 
Communities, VITAS (hospice care), and even defense contractor Lockheed-Martin (social welfare) and 
financial giant Fidelity Investments (donor-advised funds). Dees & Anderson, at 17; Salamon, supra, at 23. 
 
23Sam Dillon, Online Colleges Receive a Boost from Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2006, at A1.  Despite their 
initial popularity, some for-profit universities have come under siege and become subjects of inquiries about 
aggressive marketing, poor job placement, excessive fees, and other abusive practices.  See John Hechinger, 
Inquiry Into Florida For-Profit University Widens, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2006, at A12 (reporting on the woes 
of Corinthian Colleges and an investigation of its sales tactics by the Florida attorney general). 
 
24See generally J. GREGORY DEES, JED EMERSON & PETER ECONOMY, ENTERPRISING NONPROFITS: A TOOLKIT 
FOR SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS (2001).  For an overview of the legal issues, see Robert A. Wexler, Social 
Enterprise: A Legal Context, 54 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 233 (2006). 
 
25See NCNE=s web site at http://www.nationalcne.org.  NCNE's mission is to help nonprofit organizations 




                                           
School Initiative on Social Enterprise,26 Stanford Business School=s Center for Social 
Innovation,27 the Center for the Advancement of Social Entrepreneurship at Duke=s Fuqua 
School of Business28 and, at one time, the Yale School of Management/Goldman Sachs 
Foundation Partnership on Nonprofit Ventures.29   Proponents of this "new view" of 
nonprofit culture believe there is nothing objectionable about nondonative revenue if the 
activity itself is consistent with an organization=s social mission or if the profits are used to 
subsidize charitable Ainvestments@ (the hip term for grants).  They applaud Apartnering@ 
with for-profit firms as a means of attracting new capital and expertise to support a 
charity's socially desirable goals, and tout the intangible benefits from "synergies" between 
the sector.  Social entrepreneurs see themselves as bold and innovative change agents who 
apply their business acumen to improve society.30  One academic observer, not necessarily 
a social entrepreneur, has gone so far as to say that since "greed is good" the nonprofit 
sector should not be penalized for joining the bandwagon.31 
One critical response is the familiar complaint about unfair competition that 
supposedly influenced Congress to enact the UBIT.  Wistful traditionalists, many of whom 








29The Partnership was created Ato respond to a growing interest in income generation among nonprofit 
organizations.@  See Nicole Wallace, Charities Venture Into Business, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, May 15, 
2003.  It conducted its final competition in 2005. 
 
30Examples of social entrepreneurship include Kick Start, which distributes technology in Africa to stimulate 
economic development (http://www.approtec.org), Juma Ventures, which uses business enterprises for job 
training (http://www.Jumaventures. org), Grameen Foundation, a pioneering microfinancier which seeks to 
alleviate poverty (http://www.grameenfoundation.org), Ecotrust, a Pacific Northwest environmental group 
dedicated to preserving Salmon Nation (http://www.ecotrust.org), and Pioneer Human Services, a Seattle-
based nonprofit that runs nine businesses to support its social service activities 
(http://www.pioneerhumanservices.org).   
 
31See, e.g., Darryl K. Jones, The Greedy and the Good in Nonprofit/For-Profit Partnerships, 111 TAX NOTES 
1155 (June 5, 2006). 
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businessesCas they "hock their halos" to "milk the cash cow"32Cthey do so at the peril of 
abandoning core values.  This mission drift is said to divert charities from their original 
raison d'etre by shifting emphasis from public service to the most lucrative pursuits (that 
often fail), resulting in a less distinctive sector that eventually will weaken from loss of 
social impact and declining public respect and support.33  Critics also lament the invasion 
of the corporate culture, with its gaudy compensation packages and preoccupation with 
the bottom line, and its fostering of Amanagers@ and Adealmakers@ rather than visionary 
institution builders.34  Government regulators worry that charitable assets are being 
diverted and fiduciary duties neglected or violated as the pursuit of profit takes 
precedence over public benefit.  Legislators and tax collectors periodically vent about the 
"commerciality" problem, but they rarely act because the problem, if it is one, is complex 
and not susceptible to a simple fix. 
The mandate for this paper narrows the inquiry to a prosaic aspect of nonprofit 
sector commercialism:  the Abasic structures@ employed by nonprofits for their 
Acommercial@ activities.   Other papers will explore Acomplex@ and hybrid structures.  To 
narrow the scope and eliminate some variables, we assume that Acommercial@ is to be 
distinguished from Ainvestment@ and thus many income-producing activities that straddle 
the line (primarily real estate) are not discussed.  The line between structures that are 
Abasic@ and those that are Acomplex@ (e.g., on which side of the line are joint ventures and 
L3Cs?) is difficult to pinpoint, and so this Abasics@ paper may poach on the others at the 
margin.  The goals are to be informative (what are the basic structures and what agendas 
drive the choice of form), policy-oriented (what are the implications and trouble spots, 
with an emphasis on federal tax policy), and anthropological (what is the impact, if any, 
 
32See A.L. Spitzer, Milking the Cash CowCCommercial Activities Undertaken by Nonprofit Organizations: 
Analysis and Recommendations, in CONFERENCE: DEFINING CHARITYCA VIEW FROM THE 21ST CENTURY 
(N.Y.U. School of Law, Nat'l Center on Philanthropy & the Law, 2002), available at 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/libframe.html.  Spitzer, despite his respect for tradition, is not among those 
expressing fuzzy concerns; he is cited for his colorful metaphors and critical thinking. 
 
33See Dees & Anderson, supra note 5, at 21-24. 
 
34See, e.g., Pablo Eisenberg, Solving the Nonprofit Leadership Crisis Will Take Much Work, CHRON. 
PHILANTHROPY, Dec. 9, 2004. 
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on nonprofit culture) .  Since the author was awarded tenure many years ago and is now 
enjoying a defined benefit pension for past academic service, he does not feel obligated to 
formulate any grand thesis but only to make a few observations that flow from this 
inspection of the architecture.  For those social entrepreneurs and other readers whose 
flights are about to land and may not make it to the end of the paper, please be assured 
that the remarks to follow are not intended to condemn activities that advance an 
organization=s reasonably defined core mission, or to stifle innovation, responsible 
business planning, market efficiency, constructive synergy, or all the other wonderful 
things that are fostered by entrepreneurial nonprofits.  Indeed, many mission-driven social 
enterprises yield greater benefits than expensive fundraising campaigns.  Rather, this is a 
simple termite inspection, interspersed with occasional expressions of caution over the 
implications of an unchecked invasion of the for-profit culture and its well documented 
excesses into the nonprofit sector, the negative impact on public perceptions and respect 
for charities, and the potential adverse reaction in the form of another orgy of regulatory 
recrimination as the borders continue to blur. 
 
 II.  DEFINITIONAL DILEMMAS AND DOCTRINAL DISARRAY 
The theme of this conference presents some definitional dilemmas that most of us 
have discussed before.  For example, what do we mean by Acommercial@ and to what 
extent does that term embrace mission-related, substantially related, and unrelated 
activities?  Conversely, what is charity?    
From the perspective of modern state law, it is not difficult to qualify as a 
charitable trust or nonprofit corporation.  An organization willing to include the 
obligatory language in its governing document, adhere to the nondistribution constraint, 
and comply with a few operational formalities can easily obtain Anonprofit@ and even 
Acharitable@ or Apublic benefit@ status.35  Harder line-drawing questions are raised under 
federal tax law.  For example, what distinguishes a tax-exempt Acharity@ from a taxable 
 
35Qualification for state property tax exemption may be an exception, at least in states that have begun to 
view some commercial activities of charitable nonprofits with skepticism. 
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Abusiness@ and does the choice of structure matter?  Federal tax doctrine does not answer 
these questions with much certainty.  There is no bright line test or even a safe harbor to 
determine whether and when the conduct of a revenue-generating activity jeopardizes 
qualification for exemption under ' 501(c)(3).36   The statute merely requires an 
organization to be organized and operated "exclusively" for one or more exempt purposes. 
 The operational test regulations provide that an organization will not qualify for 
exemption "if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in furtherance of an 
exempt purpose."37  Although they offer no guidance on what types of activities do or do 
not further an exempt purpose, the regulations seem to leave some leeway for 
insubstantial business activity, whatever its motivation.  They later elaborate by providing 
that an organization will qualify for ' 501(c)(3) exemption "although it operates a trade or 
business as a substantial part of its activities, if the operation of such trade or business is in 
furtherance of the organization's exempt purpose or purposes and if the organization is 
not organized or operated for the primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated trade or 
business, as defined in Section 513."38  An organization's primary purpose is to be 
determined by all the facts and circumstances, "including the size and extent of the trade 
or business and the size or extent of the activities which are in furtherance of one or more 
exempt purposes" (emphasis added).39  
The regulations are susceptible to varying interpretations.  The conventional 
wisdom is that an otherwise qualified ' 501(c)(3) organization does not lose its exemption 
by engaging in insubstantial business activities, even if they are unrelated to its exempt 
purposes.  Substantial business activities also are permissible if they are "in furtherance of" 
 
36For illuminating discussions of the doctrinal disarray and some proposed solutions, see, e.g., John D. 
Colombo, Reforming Internal Revenue Code Provisions on Commercial Activity by Charities, 76 FORD. L. 
REV. 667 (2007); John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 487 (2002); Jessica Pena & Alexander L.T. Read, A Call for Reform of the Operational Test for 
Unrelated Business Activity in Charities, 76 N.Y.U.L.REV. 1855 (2001). 
 
37Treas. Reg. ' 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). 
 




                                           
(does that mean "related to"?) exempt purposes.  But exemption is denied if unrelated 
trade or business activities are substantial in relation to charitable activities because at that 
point the organization's "primary purpose" is a trade or business.  Congress, or at least its 
taxwriting committee staff, recently signaled that it believes this is an accurate statement 
of current law,40 although, as discussed below, the legislative history of the UBIT suggests 
that it may not be.  
It follows under this "conventional wisdom" that if an organization's unrelated 
business activities (including those conducted through partnerships, LLCs, and other joint 
ventures) are insubstantial, whatever that means, its exemption is secure and the only 
sanction is possible UBIT exposure.  But if unrelated business income or activity exceeds 
some blurry substantiality benchmark (many advisors assume it is 20 percent of total 
revenue for planning purposes; some think it is lower, others higher), the organization 
jeopardizes its exemption, whether or not the revenue is used to subsidize a charitable 
activity.  As we will see, this interpretation of the tax law loosely links the exemption 
qualification question with the UBIT relatedness standard and causes risk-averse exempt 
organizations to form taxable subsidiary corporations to conduct any major unrelated 
business.41 In many of the cases and IRS rulings, however, the inquiry begins and ends 
with an amorphous "all the facts and circumstances" smell test that never even mentions 
the UBIT or the organization=s Aprimary purpose,@ or whether the activity is Ain 
furtherance of@ a charitable purpose.  Under this dreary and inconsistent body of  
Acommerciality@ jurisprudence, a nonprofit organization that primarily engages in a 
revenue-generating activity loses its exemption if the activity has a "commercial hue" (e.g., 
it is too successful) or it appears to the fact finder to be indistinguishable from a for-profit 
competitor.42   
 
40See Joint Committee on Taxation, Historical Development and Present Law of the Federal Tax Exemption 
for Charities and Other Tax-Exempt Organizations (JCX-29-05), 51-52 (April 19, 2005). 
 
41See infra notes 58-77 and accompanying text. 
 
42See, e.g., Living Faith v. Commissioner, 950 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1991) (vegetarian restaurant and health 
food sore not exempt even though it promoted healthy living doctrine of Seventh Day Adventist Church; 
organization failed to show how it differed from for-profit competitors); compare Presbyterian & Reformed 
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A contrary theory, which is more permissive or restrictive depending on the 
context, is that current law does not impose any per se limit on the amount of unrelated 
business income or activity for ' 501(c)(3) qualification purposes.43  Proponents point to a 
cryptic 1964 published ruling holding that an organization deriving all of its support from 
real estate rents qualified for ' 501(c)(3) exemption because it conducted a charitable 
grantmaking program "commensurate in scope with its financial resources."44  The 
reasoning underlying this ruling apparently (we say Aapparently@ because the ruling did not 
contain any reasoning) assumes that Congress, in enacting the UBIT, did not intend to 
overturn the destination of income test for exemption qualification purposes except in the 
narrow case of ' 502 feeders.  It follows that any amount of unrelated business income is 
permissible provided that the organization's "primary purpose" is charitable, as measured 
(somehow) by the commensurate-in-scope standard.45  This theory evolved from an 
internal IRS debate culminating in a detailed legal memorandum opining that the 
operational test regulations permit an organization to qualify for exemption despite 
substantial unrelated business activities if its primary purpose is charitable.46  
 
Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1984) (upholding exemption for religious publisher) 
with Scripture Press Foundation v. United States, 285 F.2d 880 (Ct.Cl. 1961) (revoking religious publisher's 
exemption).  More recently, the IRS has focused its attention on discrete industries, such as credit counseling 
and down payment assistance, which have little or no donative support and do not serve any charitable 
purpose.   
43For a persuasive historically-based argument for this theory, see Kenneth C. Eliasberg, Charity and 
Commerce: Section 501(c)(3)CHow Much Unrelated Business Activity? 21 TAX L. REV. 53 (1963).  Eliasberg, 
however, may have been a special pleader.  While employed as an IRS attorney, he appears to have been a 
chief architect of the commensurate-in-scope doctrine.  See also Spitzer, supra note 32; Thomas C. Troyer, 
Quantity of Unrelated Business Consistent with Charitable ExemptionCSome Clarification, 56 TAX NOTES 
1075 (1992); John D. Colombo, Regulating Commercial Activity by Exempt Charities: Resurrecting the 
Commensurate-in-Scope Doctrine, 39 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 341 (2003). 
 
44Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186. 
 
45On occasion, the IRS has invoked the commensurate-in-scope doctrine to support revocation of exemption. 
 See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, A Taxing Time for the Bishop Estate, 21 U. HAWAII L.REV. 537, 573-578 (1999) 
(discussing the IRS's use of the doctrine against Hawaii's Bishop Estate for its failure to conduct a charitable 
program commensurate with its enormous financial resources). 
 
46See Gen. Couns. Mem. 32869 (Oct. 9, 1963).  Under this analysis, "in furtherance of" does not mean 
"related," and an organization's "primary purpose" is to be determined based on whether it has a "real, bona 
fide, or genuine charitable purpose, as manifested by the charitable accomplishments of the organization, and 
not a mathematical measuring of business purpose as opposed to charitable purpose." Id.  See also Gen. 
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So there is much confusion B especially by those who need academically tidy 
answers about the impact of commercial activity on qualification for exemption.   What is 
the right answer?  Although the IRS has never revoked Revenue Ruling 64-182 or 
formally stated that its pro-taxpayer application of the commensurate-in-scope doctrine is 
wrong, the ruling has become marginalized and should be put to sleep rather than 
resurrected.  To begin the memorial service with a few technical hymns, the activity in the 
1964 ruling was rental of commercial real estate.  Absent debt-financing, most real estate 
rents are not subject to the UBIT.  This means that the only published ruling endorsing no 
per se limit on unrelated business activity did not itself involve an unrelated business.  A 
later G.C.M. did involve an unrelated business B  a department store that paid all its net 
profits to charitable organizations.  If that store were a ' 502 feeder, it would not be 
exempt.  The IRS's distinctionCthat the department store was not a feeder because 
distributions of its income to other charities was discretionary with the board (rather than 
legally obligatory) B is hypertechnical and unsatisfying.  Moreover, the 1964 ruling 
predated the private foundation excess business holdings rules.  Under the law since 1969, 
a grantmaking charity with no public support that owns a significant stake in an operating 
business is required to divest or face severe life-threatening excise tax penalties.47  
Although these rules are avoidable if the grantmaker qualifies as a certain type of 
 
Couns. Mem. 34682 (Nov. 17, 1971). For other authorities applying the commensurate-in-scope doctrine, 
see Help the Children, Inc. v.Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1128 (1957)(organization contributing less than one 
percent of bingo revenues to charity did not qualify for exemption because its principal activity was the 
profitable operation of a commercial bingo business); Tech. Adv. Mem. 2000-21-056 (Feb. 8, 2000) 
(organization formed to give financial assistance to needy women qualifies for ' 501(c)(3) exemption even 
though 66 percent of its revenue was from operation of an unrelated business (a gift shop and tea room); IRS 
reasons that an unrelated business that raised funds for a charitable purpose is "in furtherance of" a charitable 
purpose and does not constitute a substantial non-exempt purpose); Tech. Adv. Memo 96-36-001 (Jan. 4, 
1995) (organization with substantial unrelated religious publishing activity was still exempt because no 
evidence that publishing profits were not used to further its educational purposes).  For a contrary view, see 
Orange County Agricultural Society v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1990)(organization that 
received one-third of its income from an automobile racetrack was operated for a substantial non-exempt 
purpose, but revocation of exemption also was based on inurement of private gain). 
 
47I.R.C. ' 4943, providing generally that private foundations, along with their disqualified persons (e.g., 
substantial contributors and other insiders) may not own more than 20 percent of any incorporated or 
unincorporated business enterprise.  The rationale of the excess business holdings rule has been questioned.  
See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 10, at 277-278; Richard Schmalbeck, Reconsidering Private Foundation 
Investment Limitations, 58 TAX L. REV. 59 (2004).   
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' 509(a)(3) supporting organization, the requisite relationship with the supported public 
charities might be (or at least should be) enough to classify the supporting organization as 
a feeder if, as in the 1971 G.C.M., its only activities were operating a department store 
and distributing the profits to specified charities named in its charter.48 
Quite apart from tax technicalities, the notion that an organization deriving most 
or all of its revenue from unrelated business income can qualify as a tax-exempt charity, 
even if the revenue is used to cross-subsidize charitable activities, creates serious problems 
of perception even in the absence of inurement of private gain, unfair competition, 
economic inefficiency, or other bad things.  If one were to poll all current members of the 
Congressional taxwriting committees and ask: "True or False: under current law, there is 
no per se limit on the amount of unrelated business activity that may be conducted by a 
qualified ' 501(c)(3) charity," it is highly unlikely in this author's opinion that a single 
member would answer "true."  And if the same poll were taken of all the current members 
of the American Bar Association Tax Section's Committee on Tax-Exempt Organizations, 
only a small minority of those high priests would answer "false."49  Similarly, it is unlikely 
that the IRS would issue a published ruling today expanding the commensurate-in-scope 
doctrine to give carte blanche for unlimited unrelated business activity.  Over the past year 
or so, pressured by Senator Charles Grassley and his staff pit bulls, it has been doing just 
the opposite by more frequently invoking the doctrine to revoke exemptions of Acharities@ 
that do very little that is charitable.50   
 
48Those "in the know" will respond that there are easy ways to avoid the problemCand there are.  The point 
is that the fact patterns where the IRS has permitted a charity to remain exempt despite substantial unrelated 
business income are very limited under current law. 
 
49The minority would include several respected elders and thinkers, but query whether those in private 
practice would ever write a covered opinion stating that there is no per se limit on unrelated business 
activities. 
 
50See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-18-023 (May 2, 2008) (Christian missionary with principal activity of 
sponsoring Aasset exchange programs@ through sale of annuities devoted less than .5 percent of funds received 
to charitable activities; IRS ruled that the organization was not Acharitable@ because it did Anot carry on a 
charitable program commensurate in scope with [its] financial resources.@)  See Grant Williams, IRS Denies 
Tax-Exempt Status to Group That Spends Too Little Money on Charitable Programs, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, 
May 15, 2008, at 29. 
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With this catharsis behind us, we can turn to a survey of the basic structures, the 
motivations for using them, and their implications, keeping in mind that choice of form is 
heavily influenced by the doctrinal disarray and the opportunities and pitfalls that it 
presents. 
 
 III.  A SURVEY OF BASIC STRUCTURES 
 A.  Directly Conducted Activities 
The most basic structure is to conduct an income-producing activity directly, 
especially when it is the charity=s reason for existing (e.g., health care, education, low-
income housing), or Asubstantially related,@ in UBIT parlance, to the organization=s exempt 
purposes (e.g., museum restaurants, college bookstores, and the NCAA men=s basketball 
tournament program).  In either case, there is no threat to tax exemption, no UBIT 
exposure, less complexity, and thus no compelling reason for utilizing a more complex 
structure, although non-tax factors (e.g., insulation from liabilities, separation of staff for 
compensation purposes, accounting or regulatory issues) may dictate use of corporate 
subsidiary, affiliated entity, or single-member LLC.   
The challenge for theorists and tax regulators with directly conducted commercial 
activities is in determining whether they are Acharitable@ or Asubstantially related.@  This 
inquiry is complicated (or eased, depending on one=s perspective) by what Professor 
Burton Weisbrod has called Amission vagueness@ (a better term might be Amission sprawl@), 
which has contributed to a widening away of revenue-enhancing activities that are said to 
be linked to a charity=s mission but often appear to be indistinguishable from the for-profit 
businesses with which they compete.      
Despite mission sprawl and the expansive modern notion of charity, some activities 
clearly are not mission-related, and they do raise UBIT issues.  But with planning (e.g., 
taking advantage of the permissive allocation of expense rules), even an unrelated business 
activity such as advertising (one of the most lucrative) often will not generate much if any 
tax liability.  If a directly conducted unrelated business is profitable and substantial relative 





                                           
even raise fiduciary duty issues under state law.  In those situations, a different structure, 
such as a corporate subsidiary, is usually recommended.  Alliances with outsiders, such as 
licensing and sponsorship deals and more formal ancillary joint ventures, also may be 
conducted directly, usually without any federal tax concerns, but in some cases the better 
strategy is to employ a separate entity for reasons to be developed later in the paper. 
An illuminating case study of the benefits and dangers of directly conducted 
business ventures has nothing to do with tax concerns.  It is provided by Smithsonian 
Business Ventures (ASBV@), a division of the Smithsonian Institution.  SBV was the subject 
of an extensive task force report as part of the Smithsonian=s efforts at damage control 
following a Congressional investigation triggered by news articles on various excesses and 
abuses at the venerable federal museum complex.51  From its earliest days, the 
Smithsonian had a museum shop, restaurants and cafes, and a magazine, and in the 198
it added IMAX theaters and licensing agreements.  In 1998, when the Smithsonian B
of Regents determined that the revenues from these various activities were not living up t
their potential, the board exercised its best business judgment (so no duty of care 
violation) and engaged a consultant who recommended the creation of Aan operationally 
and culturally distinct entity@ with a separate governing board, an incentive-based 
compensation structure, and Astrong business leaders@ to manage the activities going 
forward.52  The Smithsonian board endorsed this approach, emphasizing that the new 
organization should be Aprofit-driven@ with a compensation system designed to attract 
employees Afrom the business world@ and provide them with financial incentives to 
succeed.  A separate division B Smithsonian Business Ventures B was formed, with its own 
CEO and Aboard of directors@ (since SBV was not a separate entity, this advisory board 
was not subject to the same fiduciary duties as the legally constituted Board of Regents), 
 
51See Task Force on Smithsonian Business Ventures, Increasing the Contribution of Revenue-Generating 
Activities to the Smithsonian Institution Mission [hereinafter ATask Force Report@] (Jan. 28, 2008), available 
at http://newsdesk.si.edu/releases/SBV-task-force-report.pdf.   For press coverage, see Robin Pogrebin, Report 
Details Smithsonian Business Unit=s Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008, at A17; Jacqueline Trescott & 
James V. Grimaldi, Smithsonian Termed AEndangered@; Board Structure Questioned, WASH. POST, April 12, 
2007, at C1. 
 
52Task Force Report, at 56-57. 
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and a mandate to Amaximize the financial value of the assets under its stewardship to 
support the overall mission of the Institution@ and to evaluate the CEO=s performance.53  
The salaries of SBV employees, unlike those of museum staff, were performance driven, 
with a complex web of targeted benchmarks common to the for-profit sector.  SBV=s CEO 
oversaw multiple departments, including human resources, member services, licensing, 
retail operations, publishing, and media services54 and reported to Smithsonian=s then 
Secretary (its term for CEO), Lawrence Small.   
 The Task Force concluded that generation of unrestricted revenue through 
commercial activities was a desirable and important source of funding at the Smithsonian 
but only when conducted in consonance with the Smithsonian=s mission and values B i.e., 
the activities should support the Institution=s scholarship and programs by offering 
Aauthentic and high-quality products, media content, and visitor services@ that complement 
the mission of increasing and diffusing knowledge.55   It recommended that the 
Smithsonian continue to manage its business ventures as a distinct Abut not separate@ 
operational unit, albeit with a different name B ASmithsonian Enterprises or something 
similar@ was suggested B and found that the greatest revenue potential was in web-based 
communication for catalog sales and publications.56   
SBV=s most serious flaw was its physical and cultural separation from the mission of 
the Institution and its professional staff.  Collaboration was weak or non-existent; SBV 
executives and museum curators did not communicate with one another; SBV=s activities 
were not transparent; SBV lacked a coherent system for sharing its revenue with 
constituent units of the Institution; museum staff were alienated by the generous incentive 
compensation structure for SBV employees; and the governance structure was disjointed, 
with inadequate oversight.  Notably, all these deficiencies existed even though SBV was 
not a separate legal entity, as the outside consultant had recommended. 
 
53Id. at 57-59. 
 
54Id. at 59-60. 
 
55Id. at 4-7. 
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SBV may be an isolated case, unique to the Smithsonian with its odd and 
dysfunctional board structure that is currently under repair.  But the SBV debacle (among 
others) serves as a reminder that making money is a risky business, more likely to fail than 
succeed.  More importantly, commercial ventures can interfere with a charity=s ability to 
fulfill its core mission and infect its culture.  The Smithsonian Task Force report should be 
required reading for any nonprofit board that is considering a major business expansion.  
Also instructive is a recent study by the Seedco Policy Center.  While acknowledging the 
value of creative financing and outside-the-box thinking, Seedco’s researchers found that 
most nonprofit business ventures fail to make money and rarely, if ever, generate enough 
revenue to sustain the organization by cross-subsidizing charitable activities.57  
 B.  Corporate Subsidiaries 
 1.  Motivations for Use   
Some charities conduct commercial activities through wholly owned corporate 
subsidiaries formed as taxable C corporations.  Although affiliated nonprofit entities also 
may be used to further charitable purposes,58 our focus here is on for-profit subsidiaries.  
Why use them?  This structure is not motivated solely by tax considerations. The tax-
exempt parent may wish to insulate itself from the liabilities of the business activity; adopt 
compensation arrangements, fringe benefit plans or accounting methods that are more 
suitable for a for-profit entity; employ different management structures; expand access to 
investment capital; avoid public disclosure of certain sensitive financial information; 
protect some members of the tax-exempt parent=s governing board from liability; and 
 
56Id. at 8-10, 34-35. 
57Seedco Policy Center, The Limits of Social Enterprise: A Field Study & Case Analysis (June 2007), available 
at http://www.seedco.org/publications/publications/social_enterprise.pdf.  See also William Foster & Jeffrey 
Bradach, Should Nonprofits Seek Profits?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 2005), which includes a study finding that 
Athere is every reason to believe that the lion=s share of earned-income ventures do not succeed at generating 
revenue beyond their costs.@ 
 
58Tax-exempt subsidiaries are used for some of the same non-tax reasons as taxable subsidiaries B e.g., 
creditor protection for the parent, facilitating separate management and compensation structures, and 
sometimes attracting government or private funding that is not available to the parent.  Tax-exempt 
subsidiaries usually achieve public charity status as ' 509(a)(3) supporting organizations. 
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circumvent regulatory obstacles.59    All of this can be accomplished if the subsidiary is 
properly structured and corporate formalities are observed.  Some overlap in board 
membership and management is permitted, but good practice dictates the presence of 
independent outside directors for the subsidiary, and the parent=s proper role is as a 
shareholder, with the power to elect and replace directors, rather than a day-to-day 
manager.   
Tax considerations also play a role.   Under current exemption qualification 
standards, the activities and income of separate controlled entities generally are not taken 
into account in determining whether an organization's "primary purpose" is a tax-exempt 
purposeCat least if the parent does not exercise day-to-day operational control over the 
subsidiary's activities.  Exempt organizations thus may conduct substantial unrelated 
business activities through subsidiaries without risking their exemption even though, under 
the "conventional wisdom" discussed earlier, their favored tax status might be threatened if 
they conducted the same activities directly.60  Taxable subsidiaries also can serve as the 
general partner when an exempt organization engages in a joint business venture with 
for-profit entrepreneurs and investors. The parent’s exemption might be jeopardized if it 
served directly as a general partner in ventures where the partnership activity does not 
otherwise further the organization's exempt purposes. 
Under current law, the separate identity of a controlled subsidiary is almost always 
respected by the Service. In this area, the tax doctrine of substance over form gives way to 
an equally hoary line of cases that respect a corporation's separate existence.61  The 
business activities of the subsidiary are not attributed to the parent if the purposes for 
which the subsidiary is formed are the equivalent of business activities, or the subsidiary 
subsequently carries on business activities. But if the parent so controls the affairs of the 
 
59For the historical development of the use of taxable subsidiaries, see James J. McGovern, The Use of 
Taxable Subsidiary Corporations by Public Charities B A Tax Policy Issue for 1988, 38 TAX NOTES 1125 
(Mar. 7, 1988). 
 
60This structure is only useful to public charities.  Private foundations and now some ' 509(a)(3) supporting 
organizations are impeded by the excess business holdings rules in ' 4943. 
 
61See, e.g., Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 63 S.Ct. 1132, 87 L.Ed. 1499 (1943); 
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subsidiary that it is merely an instrumentality of the parent, the separate corporate status 
of the subsidiary can be disregarded. Against this permissive background, the use of 
complex structures began to proliferate in the 1980s, particularly in the health care 
sector.62 
Use of a controlled subsidiary also may reduce the overall tax burden from one or 
more business activities even if tax exemption would not be threatened if the businesses 
were conducted directly by the charity.  For example, a for-profit subsidiary could be 
employed to conduct two separate activities, one unprofitable and related and the other 
profitable and unrelated, enabling the losses to offset the gains.  This strategic allocation 
of expenses could not be accomplished if the activities were conducted directly, although 
it will backfire if the related activity turns around and begins to generate a profit.  Taxable 
subsidiaries also make it easier to match revenue and expenses and avoid squabbles with 
the IRS over allocation issues.   
In deciding whether to form a for-profit subsidiary, a charity’s board must be 
mindful of its fiduciary duties of loyalty and care, including prudent investment standards 
and avoidance of conflicts of interest.  Exit strategies must be anticipated, and the 
complexity and extra expense of a subsidiary evaluated.  In most cases, the business 
judgment rule, including reliance on experts, adherence to a conflict of interest policy, and 
thoroughly documenting the decision making process, will protect directors from liability. 
 A broader question is whether formation of a for-profit subsidiary implicates the duty of 
obedience, if there is one.  If, as most believe, there no such separate legal duty, query 
whether fidelity to the organization’s mission should be imported more robustly into the 
duties of loyalty and care.63  And with more information about charities easily accessible 
 
National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 69 S.Ct. 726, 93 L.Ed. 779 (1949).  
62In the interest of time and compassion, corporate tax mavens will be disappointed as we dispense with any 
discussion of other tax consequences on formation B e.g, ' 351 and related Code sections.  Suffice it to note 
that issues exist and most are surmountable with planning. 
 
63For a persuasive argument in favor of a state law duty of fidelity to mission, see Linda Sugin, Resisting the 




t to investigative journalists and nonprofit beat reporters, public perceptions and their effec
on an organization=s reputation also should be considered.    
  2.  Payments from Controlled Subsidiaries 
If a controlled subsidiary makes any money, tax planning can ease the pain as cash 
flows back to the tax-exempt parent.  The proper tax treatment of payments such as 
dividends, interest, rents and royalties is a much-debated subject.   The agenda is tax 
arbitrage: reducing the subsidiary’s taxable bottom line by making payments that are 
deductible by the for-profit but not taxable as UBTI to the parent.   For readers still in 
flight, seat belts should be tightened, as this is technical material without a crystal clear 
solution. 
Payments from subsidiaries to tax-exempt parents historically were viewed as 
opportunities for tax avoidance.  To reduce the subsidiary’s tax bill and provide the parent 
with a nontaxable investment return, dividends should be avoided or minimized.  Instead, 
the parent can loan money, rent real property, or license intellectual property to the 
subsidiary in exchange for regular payments.  This widely recommended technique works 
unless the subsidiary is too thinly capitalized (converting debt to equity) or the payments 
exceed an arm=s length benchmark.  Is this a problem requiring correction, or is it only 
abusive if and to the extent that the payments exceed the value of the property or services 
for which the payments are being made?  Is it relevant that the exempt organization 
controls the subsidiary and, if so, how should control be measured?   
Beginning in 1969, Congress enacted legislation to police payments from 
controlled subsidiaries.  Section 512(b)(13), as it was then, treated what otherwise was 
excludable passive investment income as taxable by tracing the payment back to the 
subsidiary's business operations and treating it as UBTI to the parent to the extent it was 
sheltered (through deductions) by the subsidiary.  Inflated payments were a major concern 
but a broader theory, it seems, was that payments labeled as interest, royalties or rent were 
really attributable to the profits of an unrelated business when made by a taxable 
subsidiary to its tax-exempt parent.  The cure was accomplished by including in UBTI all 
or part of interest, annuities, royalties and rent (but not dividends) received by a 
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"controlling organization" from a "controlled entity".64  Under the current version of 
' 512(b)(13), Acontrol@ is defined as ownership (by vote or value) of more than 50 percent 
of the stock of a corporation,65 and constructive ownership rules apply in measuring 
control.66  Prior to 1997, "control" was determined by an 80 percent test without 
attribution rules.67    
When Congress acted in 1997 to strengthen the definition of control in 
' 512(b)(13), tax advisors to adversely affected organizations emerged from their 
previously secure bunkers to question the fundamental premise of the longstanding anti-
abuse rule, arguing that it tries "to kill an ant with a sledgehammer" and violates rather 
than enforces basic tax principles.68  They argued that the only problem is when the 
subsidiary pays an inflated price to the parent for property or services.  So viewed, the 
cure goes well beyond the abuse, and the proper remedy was to replace ' 512(b)(13) with 
an arm's length standard along the lines of ' 482, which regulates abusive transactions 
between commonly controlled taxpayers in the for-profit sector.69   To illustrate, assume 
an exempt organization ("P") has a wholly owned subsidiary ("S") that engages in an 
unrelated business.  P owns a building that is available for rental as office space.  If P leases 
the space to S at market rates, S can deduct the rent which is then taxable to P under 
' 512(b)(13).  If P leases the space to an unrelated third party ("U"), U can deduct the rent, 
and it will not be taxable to P.  The after-tax return from the building is lower, so the 
argument goes, when P leases space to S than when it leases to U, causing exempt 
 
64I.R.C. ' 512(b)(13)(C).   
65I.R.C. ' 512(b)(13)(D)(i)(I).  For the definition of "control" in other settings, see I.R.C. 
' 512(b)(13)(D)(i)(II), (III). 
 
66I.R.C. ' 512(b)(13)(D)(ii). 
 
67See, e.g. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-38-003 (June 18, 1993).   This loose definition enabled just about any well-
advised charity to avoid the impact of ' 512(b)(13) by breaking control (easily accomplished) or through 
crafty devices such as the "double drop down," under which a holding company was placed between the 
exempt parent and the second-tier taxable subsidiary. 
 
68See, e.g., Fred Stokeld, EO Specialists Have Doubts About Section 512(b)(13) Modification, 17 EXEMPT 
ORG. TAX REV. 246, 247 (Aug. 1997). 
 
69For the most comprehensive critique, complete with algebraic equations, see Harry L. Gutman, Taxing 
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organizations to be driven away from contractual relationships with subsidiaries and 
toward relationships with third parties.  In addition, the rental income has nothing to do 
with capital P invests in S.  If P used its control to cause S to pay above-market rent, that 
would shift UBTI from S to P, but only to the extent of the excess.  Taxing P on the fair 
market rent received from S is overkill and represents an inefficient and arbitrary tax 
penalty, given the overall policy to exclude rent from UBTI.70  
Advocates of a Afair market value@ exception in ' 512(b)(13) prevailed when 
Congress temporarily amended ' 512(b)(13) in the Pension Protection Act of 2006.  The 
amendment was effective for payments received or accrued after December 31, 2005 and 
before January 1, 2008.71  New ' 512(b)(13)(E) provided that the recharacterization rule 
shall apply only to the portion of interest, rent, annuity, or royalty payments received or 
accrued in a taxable year that exceeds the amount of the specified payment that would 
have been paid or accrued if the payment had been determined under the arm=s length 
standard principles used to patrol transactions between commonly controlled taxpayers 
under ' 482.  As a result, if a payment by a controlled subsidiary to a tax-exempt parent 
exceeds fair market value, this excess amount is generally included in the parent’s UBTI.  
In addition, a 20 percent valuation misstatement penalty is imposed on excess payments 
received by a controlling parent.72  Congress directed the Treasury to study this issue and 
submit a report to the tax-writing committees by January 1, 2009 (don’t hold your breath) 
on the effectiveness of the IRS’s administration of amended ' 512(b)(13), the results of 
any audits, and recommendations relating to the tax treatment of payments from 
controlled to controlling organizations.     
 
Transactions Between Exempt Parents and their Affiliates, 84 TAX NOTES 1081 (Aug. 16, 1999).   
70One point the opponents fail to address is why P chose to hold back the building (or cash, or patent, and so 
on) and lease it to S rather than contribute it along with the other capital needed to launch and operate the 
business. 
 
71There is bipartisan support to extend the amendment for another two years but, as this footnote is being 
written in September 2008, Congressional gridlock has impeded extender legislation.  A bold prediction B it 
will be extended by the time of the conference.  Breaking news B it was extended, for two years, by ' 306 of 
the economic Arescue@ legislation enacted in early October. 
72I.R.C. '' 512(b)(13)(E)(ii). 
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So the debate continues.  Defenders of the historical approach to ' 512(b)(13) 
argue that an arm's length standard is inadequate because even in the absence of abusive 
pricing, P is not making a passive investment when it leases the building to S (as it would 
be if it rented the building to an outsider).73  They contend that excluding arm's length 
payments from a controlled subsidiary would permit the exempt parent to get a tax-free 
return on capital used in an active business that it controls.  Consider this comparison.  
Assume P owns a building and uses it in an unrelated trade or business conducted directly 
by P rather than through a subsidiary.  P is taxed on the net profits from this business, 
including its "implicit return" on all its capital, including the building.  If P opts to operate 
the business through S, and S could deduct the rent payable to P, less tax would be payable 
than if P ran the business directly or contributed the building to S.  Allowing an "internal 
deduction" in these circumstances results in less overall tax liability to the P/S group than if 
P operated the business directly or S owned and used the building -- the very result 
' 512(b)(13) is supposed to prevent. 
Section 512(b)(13) raises a tricky policy question.  It seems appropriate to prevent 
a conversion of taxable trade or business income to excludable investment income in 
situations where the income-producing property is owned by the exempt organization and 
used in an unrelated trade or business.  Moreover, importing ' 482 transfer pricing 
principles, with all their attendant valuation disputes and opportunities for manipulation, 
would be difficult to administer.  In this area, if in doubt, going with the bright line rule is 
a safer solution.74 
Another lingering question is -- how should control be defined?  Even under 
current law, the look-through rule of ' 512(b)(13) is avoidable if a group of exempt 
organizations form a subsidiary to operate a taxable business.  Assume, for example, that 
four prestigious universities each own 25 percent of the stock of a C corporation that 
 
73See, e.g., Michael Schler, Letter to the Editor: The Implicit Rationale for Section 512(b)(13), 84 TAX NOTES 
1329 (Aug. 30, 1999). 
 
74For a thoughtful and deeper argument to this effect, see Daniel Halperin, The Unrelated Business Income 
Tax and Payments from Controlled Entities, 109 TAX NOTES 1443 (Dec. 12, 2005). 
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operates an online "e-learning" university, each licensing technology, alumni lists, and 
other tangible property as agreed.75  Since none of the universities are related to each 
other and none have 50% control, royalty payments should retain their exclusion from 
UBTI.  If this is an abuse, ' 512(b)(13) will not correct it. 
 3.  Other Tax Policy Issues Involving Subsidiaries 
   During its scrutiny of the UBIT in the late 1980s, the Oversight Subcommittee of 
the House Ways and Means Committee made several specific proposals to limit the use of 
controlled subsidiary tax avoidance strategies. One controversial recommendation would 
have required the activities of an exempt parent and its controlled subsidiaries to be 
aggregated in testing whether the organization=s primary purpose was tax exempt.76  The 
proposal never gained traction.  Under current law, however, unrelated business activities 
conducted through a partnership or LLC are attributed to the tax-exempt partner or 
member and may threaten tax exemption even though conducting the same business in a 
C corporation subsidiary removes the threat.  Form often prevails over substance in 
transactional tax planning, but it seems more sensible, at least for determining the impact 
of business activities on exempt status, not to make distinctions based on the legal form 
(corporation vs. pass-through entity) in which the activity is conducted.77 
A bolder proposal would be to extend the '4943 excess business holdings rules to 
public charities.78  If those rules were imported in their present form, controlled taxable 
subsidiaries would cease to be viable structures.  A third option B a punt so that we can 
analyze more data B would be to make the activities and finances of controlled subsidiaries 
 
75See, e.g., Bill Workman, Top Universities Join E-Learning Experiment, S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 2, 2000, at B2, 
which describes such an alliance between Stanford, Oxford, Yale and Princeton. 
 
76Subcomm. on Oversight, House Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., Draft Report 
Describing Recommendations in the Unrelated Business Tax (Comm. Print 1988) (hereinafter A1988 Draft 
UBIT Report@). 
 
77See Colombo, supra note 36, at 689, who objects to this formalistic distinction and also proposes that the 
UBIT should extend to Aall commercial activities by charities, whether related or not,@ while adding that they 
should not adversely affect tax exemption if the revenues are used to cross-subsidize charitable outputs. 
 
78See McGovern, supra note 59, who argued that Aan intensive look at the imposition of the section 4943 
excess business holdings rules on public charities is appropriate.@ 
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more transparent by requiring public disclosure of their tax returns, with the ability to 
redact trade secrets and other proprietary information.  Now that Form 990-T=s are 
available to the public and the questions asked on the new Form 990 are more 
comprehensive, this is a likely next step but one that will face heated opposition by 
charities who believe such public disclosure is an invasion of privacy and a threat to their 
taxable businesses in a competitive environment.   
 C.  Partnerships, LLCs and S Corporations 
 1.  In General 
Partnerships, LLCs and S corporations are treated as pass-through entities for 
income tax purposes.   These forms are frequently employed as structures in which 
charities participate as passive investors (e.g., limited partners or non-managing LLC 
members), such as in real estate, hedge funds, private equity, oil and gas, and other hard 
assets B all beyond the scope of this paper.  If a partnership (including LLCs, which are 
treated as partnerships for tax purposes) regularly carries on an unrelated trade or 
business, any net unrelated business taxable income passes through and is treated as UBTI 
to its tax-exempt partners even if they hold their interests as limited partners and play no 
role in management of the business.79  Interest, dividends, rents, and other passive 
investment income items of the partnership, however, are generally excluded from the 
partner=s UBTI absent debt-financing.  These rules are faithful the principles of pass-
through taxation and preclude an easy end run around the policy of the UBIT.   
Like partnerships and LLCs, S corporations are generally not subject to entity-level 
taxation and pass through their tax items to their shareholders.  Since 1998, tax-exempt 
organizations have been permissible shareholders of S corporations but with a trade-off.  
As a result, an exempt organization=s entire interest in an S corporation, even if held as an 
investment, is Atreated as an interest in an unrelated trade or business,@80 and its share of S 
corporation tax items, including passive investment income such as dividends and interest 
that would not be subject to the UBIT if realized directly or through a partnership or LLC, 
 
79I.R.C. ' 512(c).  See Service Bolt & Nut Co. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 812 (1982). 
 
80I.R.C. ' 512(e)(1).   
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are taken into account in determining UBTI.  For this and other reasons (e.g., lack of 
flexibility in crafting ownership interests), S corporations are rarely chosen by charities for 
commercial or investment activities.  When a charity receives a donation of S corporation 
stock and is unable to liquidate the holding promptly, it must make a cost/benefit analysis 
in deciding whether to accept the gift.  There usually is a benefit, but some charities view 
exposure to the UBIT as a communicable disease or are uncomfortable with the 
complexity that an S corporation holding may bring.  
 2.  Limited Liability Companies 
In the 1980s, limited liability companies (LLCs) arrived on the scene and in 20 
years they have become the best of all worlds structure for conducting a privately held for-
profit business.  The major advantage of  LLCs are well known: limited liability for all 
owners, even those that participate in management; pass-through income taxation; and 
flexibility in governance and ownership structure.  Thanks to the liberal check-the-box 
treasury regulations, multiple-member LLCs enjoy default classification as partnerships for 
federal tax purposes.81  Single-member LLCs, now permitted in every state, are treated as 
disregarded entities unless they elect to be taxed as a corporation.82  As such, their income, 
deductions and other tax items are treated as realized by their single member and they do 
not have to file separate tax returns.   In the for-profit world, the number of LLCs 
increased 1,136 percent between 1995 and 2005 (from 115,559 to 1,465,223), and LLCs 
now outnumber limited partnerships by more than 2 to 1.83  The IRS has recognized that 
an LLC wholly owned by a single ' 501 exempt organization may be a disregarded entity 
unless it elects to be taxed as a corporation, and the exempt owner must treat the 
operations and finances of the LLC as its own for tax and information reporting 
purposes.84     
 
81Treas. Reg. ' 301.7701-2(c)(1). 
 
82Treas. Reg. ' 301.7701-2(c)(2). 
 
83Tim Wheeler & Nina Shumofsky, Partnership Returns 2005, 27 SOI BULLETIN 69 (2007). 
 
84Ann. 99-102, 1999-43 I.R.B. 545. 
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LLCs have limited utility for tax-exempt organizations conducting a substantial 
unrelated business.  Like partnerships but unlike C corporations, the business activities of 
an LLC will be attributed to its tax-exempt owner.  As a result, unless it elects to be taxed 
as a corporation, an LLC that conducts a substantial unrelated trade or business, violates 
the inurement or private benefit limitation, or engages in more lobbying or political 
campaign activity than permitted by ' 501(c)(3), will jeopardize its parent=s tax 
exemption.  In some cases, this attribution of activities is a good thing B e.g., it may permit 
a nonprofit hospital that contributes its operating assets to a joint venture with a for-profit 
partner to retain its public charity status, assuming the co-owned facility conforms to the 
community benefit standard and the nonprofit partner does not cede control.85  It follows 
that LLCs are not effective vehicles to avoid the UBIT or protect against loss of tax 
exemption.   The major uses of single-member LLCs by charities are to insulate their 
exempt parent from liability by holding real property (an alternative to using a ' 501(c)(2) 
title holding company) or to conduct high-risk Arelated@ activities (e.g., clinical trials of 
pharmaceuticals).  Multiple member LLCs are most commonly used in ancillary joint 
ventures with private individuals and for-profit partners.  These structures are discussed in 
Parts IV and V, below.   
A less settled question is whether an LLC can itself be a tax-exempt organization.  
Initially, this is a question of state law.  Some states require an LLC to be formed for a 
Abusiness purpose.@  Others, such as California, allow LLCs to engage in any lawful 
business activity, Awhether or not for profit.@ 86  Assuming the LLC form is available to a 
nonprofit organization under state law, the IRS will recognize it as exempt under 
' 501(c)(3) if elects to be treated as a separate legal entity for tax purposes and its 
operating agreement includes the obligatory magic language (purposes, distribution of 
assets on dissolution, etc.) mandated by the organizational test and it meets 12 additional 
 
85See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 
86Cal. Corp. Code ' 17002. 
 
 29 
                                           
requirements largely designed to patrol against inurement and private benefit.87  A key 
requirement is that the LLC=s members must be ' 501(c)(3) organizations or government 
units or instrumentalities.  For that reason, among others, the IRS recently denied 
exemption to an LLC organized exclusively for charitable purposes because its sole 
member was a pastor who used the LLC to provide chaplaincy and other counseling 
services to the elderly for a fee.88 
 
 IV.   JOINT VENTURES WITH FOR-PROFITS 
 A. What is a Joint Venture? 
Joint ventures come in many shapes and sizes, and their legal structures vary, as do 
the roles played by the nonprofit partner.  Michael Sanders, who has written a 907-page 
treatise on the topic, defines a joint venture as "an association of persons or entities jointly 
undertaking a particular transaction for mutual profit."89  He divides nonprofit joint 
ventures into four categories: (1) alliances involving only tax-exempt organizations,90 (2) 
passive investment joint ventures,91 (3) joint ventures in which the nonprofit partner 
contributes all or substantially all its assets (what we will call "whole-activity" joint 
ventures), and (4) those that represent only a portion of the assets or activities of the 
nonprofit partner ("ancillary" joint ventures).  Some joint ventures are conducted through 
an entityCmost typically, a partnership or limited liability company.  Other economic 
 
87See Richard A. McCray & Ward L. Thomas, Limited Liability Companies as Exempt 
OrganizationsBUpdate, EO Technical Instruction Program for FY 2001, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicb01.pdf (hereinafter AMcCray & Thomas@). 
 
88Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-027-041 (July 4, 2008). 
 
89MICHAEL I. SANDERS, JOINT VENTURES INVOLVING TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. 2007). 
 
90An example would be two ' 501(c)(3) health care providers that wish to operate their facilities as a 
combined entity without a merger.  Assuming the joint venture does not stray from its charitable mission or 
engage in unrelated business activities, the Service has ruled that such an arrangement would neither 
jeopardize the exemption of the venturers or result in UBTI.  See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-220-42 (June 4, 
1997). 
 
91Although Sanders and others properly have used the term "joint venture" to encompass participation by 
exempt organizations in investment pools or direct but passive minority investments in start-up companies, 
those situations do not really fit the more active mold we are considering in this paper and will be mentioned 
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alliances use a wide variety of contractual arrangements, such as technology licensing 
agreements, exclusive provider deals, and corporate sponsorships.  These collaborations 
often leverage a charity's intangible assets, such as intellectual property or a valuable brand 
name or expertise that is ripe for exploitation.   
Formal structures attracting the most attention from the IRS have been whole 
activity joint ventures (almost always involving hospitals) and the more prevalent ancillary 
joint ventures.  In a whole activity joint venture, all of a charity's assets are transferred in 
exchange for an interest in a limited partnership or LLC which usually is managed by an 
affiliate of the for-profit partner.  The nonprofit typically continues as a grantmaking 
entity, but for tax purposes it is deemed under an aggregate theory to be principally 
engaged in the LLC's activities.  The joint venture is said to be "whole" because it is the 
substantial or sole activity of the exempt organization, apart from grantmaking.  In an 
ancillary joint venture, the charity does not contribute all of its operating assets and its 
participation in the venture is not the organization's sole activity.92  In a hospital ancillary 
joint venture, for example, the activity could be a core function (e.g., the anesthesiology 
department), or a relatively insubstantial pursuit (e.g., a dialysis unit), or a support 
function (e.g., a laundry).  In a university setting, an ancillary joint venture might be a 
technology alliance, an on-campus hotel, distance learning programs, or links between a 
law or business school and a for-profit publisher or continuing education provider.   
Joint ventures can be an effective means for a nonprofit organization to raise 
private capital and earn valuable unrestricted revenue.  Many  joint ventures are justified 
as directly advancing the nonprofit partner=s core mission, or at least  "contributing 
importantly" to exempt purposes.  It is reasonable to assume that the motives of the for-
profit partners are market-oriented, not altruistic, although a new breed of philanthropic 
for-profits is emerging to challenge that assumption.93  Most for-profit joint venturers in 
 
only in passing.   
92See generally Mary Jo Salins, Judy Kindell & Marvin Friedlander, Whole Hospital Joint Ventures, FY 1999 
IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM 1 (1998). 
 
93See infra notes 164-165 and accompanying text for a discussion of L3Cs. 
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health care, education and housing seek to profit from the nonprofit partner's reputation, 
name recognition, intellectual capital, and "fuzzy good" image, or to take advantage of 
targeted tax benefits such as credits for low-income housing.     
The precise number and economic significance of joint ventures is difficult to 
quantify.  Public information is scarce because nonprofit participants in joint ventures 
historically have not been required to disclose many details on their annual Form 990 
information returns.94  Nonprofits entering into alliances with for-profit firms are sensitive 
about divulging any specifics, viewing the information as proprietaryCor perhaps they fear 
a backlash from legislators, regulators, donors and the general public.  As a result of this 
information deficiency, much of what is known about the structures used for joint 
ventures is based on a handful of reported cases and private rulings, news reports, 
anecdotes, trade gossip (for those with access to it), and speculation.  In this area, details 
matter, and informal efforts to convince nonprofit joint venture participants and their 
counsel to discuss their deals on (or even off) the record with any specificity were met 
with muted resistance or apologetic blank staresCan understandable response, perhaps, in 
view of the ethical constraints on revealing confidential client information.  The current 
(2007) version of Form 990 asks (Part VI, Question 88) if at any time during the year the 
organization owned a 50 percent or greater interest in a taxable corporation, partnership 
or disregarded entity (e.g., single-member LLC).  If the answer is yes, the name, 
percentage ownership interest, nature of activities, total income, and end-of-year assets 
must be provided in Part IX. Exempt organizations must disclose if they had unrelated 
business gross income of more than $1,000 and, if so, whether they filed a Form 990-T 
UBIT return, but Form 990-T is not subject to public disclosure. Part VII of Form 990 
includes a very general "analysis" of income-producing activities, and organizations are 
 
94The Joint Committee on Taxation and others have proposed requiring exempt organizations to disclose 
their Form 990s except for trade secrets or other highly confidential proprietary information.  Staff of Joint 
Committee on Taxation, Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax Expenditures, 109th Cong., 
1st Sess. 310-311 (JCS-02-05, Jan. 27, 2005) (hereinafter "Joint Committee 2005 Tax Reform Options"), 
available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-2-05/pdf.  The Panel on the Nonprofit Sector opposed disclosure of 
990-Ts, recommending instead expanded reporting of unrelated business activities.  Panel on the Nonprofit 
Sector, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS, A 
SUPPLEMENT TO THE FINAL REPORT (hereinafter "Supplemental Report") 26-27 (April 2006). 
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required to include gross amounts of unrelated business income in broad categories, but 
this information is cryptic and often incomplete. Data about the most influential 
institutions also is scarce because government instrumentalities, including most public 
colleges and universities, are not required to file Form 990.  The revised Form 990, which 
makes its debut for 2008 tax years, will probe further in its new Schedule R (Related 
Organizations and Unrelated Partnerships) by requiring more detailed information on 
disregarded entities and related organizations (with separate schedules for exempt 
affiliates, partnerships, and corporations and trusts).  For related organizations taxable as 
partnerships through which the 990 filer conducted more than five percent of its activities 
(measured by total assets or gross revenue), additional information is required.  It will take 
a while, but once they become widely available, the new Form 990s will yield a treasure 
chest of new data about nonprofit business and investment structures.   
  B. Some Examples  
Some examples, gathered from press releases, news reports, private rulings, and 
shop talk, offer a glimpse at the variety of contemporary joint ventures.  In the interest of 
brevity, some important details and nuances have been omitted.   
 
In June 2006, Baptist Health System of East Tennessee announced that it 
had signed a letter of intent to form a joint venture with for-profit Triad 
Hospitals to operate Baptist's four hospitals.  Triad will have 80 percent 
ownership and Baptist will retain 20 percent; governance will be shared 
50:50; physicians will have at least 50 percent board representation and "be 
given the immediate opportunity to invest in the new joint venture."  The 
infusion of capital will permit Baptist to immediately pay off $210 million in 
debt.  According to the chair of Baptist's board, the hospitals will "maintain 
the Baptist faith-based mission and commitment to charity care at the 
current level."95  This is what we will come to know as a whole hospital joint 
venture.  
 
Community Neighborhood Housing, Inc. ("CNH") is a ' 501(c)(3) charity 
dedicated to providing low-income housing in compliance with IRS safe harbor 
guidelines. To obtain the necessary capital and efficiently utilize federal low-income 
 
95Press Release, June 14, 2006, available at 
http://www.baptistoneword.org/whatsnew/newsreleases/newsDetail.asp?id=284.   
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housing tax credits allocated to it by its home state, CNH enters into a limited 
partnership with For-Profit Syndicators ("FPS"), a pool of for-profit investors, to 
own and operate a low-income housing complex.96 CNH will serve as the sole 
general partner, and FPS will be a limited partner, providing 99 percent of the 
equity capital for the project.  LP's participation is motivated by the ability to 
obtain low-income housing tax credits.  The partnership agreement provides that 
CNH will have operational control of the project, which must be operated in a 
manner that is consistent with CNH's charitable purposes.  In keeping with 
standard industry practice, the agreement obligates CNH to provide various 
indemnifications and guarantees to FPS, such as an indemnification for any loss or 
damage attributable to environmental hazards and guarantees to advance funds if 
necessary for completion of construction or to cover operating deficits. 
 
In 2004, the University of Delaware and for-profit Shaner Hotel Group 
formed Blue Hen Hotel, LLC, to develop and operate a 126-room hotel on 
university land near the central campus.  The university owns a 75 percent 
interest and Shaner, which will manage the hotel as a Courtyard by 
Marriott, owns 25 percent.  Students in the university's hotel, restaurant and 
institutional management school work at the hotel, which is adjacent to the 
university's 40,000 square foot and highly profitable conference center.97  
This is an ancillary joint venture. 
 
In 2006, Showtime Networks and the Smithsonian Institution announced an 
agreement to develop Smithsonian Networks, a cable television channel to 
produce and broadcast a cable television channel, Smithsonian on Demand, 
with programming to be drawn from the Smithsonian's collections and 
curators.  Under the agreement, commercial filmmakers who wish to make 
"more than incidental" use of Smithsonian archives or curators must receive 
approval from this venture.  According to news reports, Showtime will pay 
the Smithsonian a flat fee for the rights plus additional fees based on the 
number of subscribers to the service and will pay the cost of producing 
roughly 100 hours of programming a year.98  In response to queries from 
 
96This is a generic example of a typical low-income housing joint venture, adapted from a letter to the IRS 
from two leading practitioners.  See Letter from Michael A. Sanders & Celia A. Roady to Steven T. Miller, 
Director, IRS Exempt Organizations, TE/GE Division (hereinafter "Sanders/Roady Letter"), May 3, 2002, 
available at 2001 Tax Notes Today 106-67. 
 
97Milford, supra note 15.  The university's web site reports that students are involved in all aspects of the 
hotel, from the front office to accounts and engineering, sales and marketingC"students will have total 
immersion in the hotel industry" in "a working laboratory."  See www.udel.edu/hotel.  Since the University of 
Delaware, as a public university, is not obligated to file a Form 990 information return, it is impossible to 
determine if the hotel partnership gives rise to any unrelated business income.  It is fair to assume, however, 
that the business is treated as a "related" activity because of the student involvement. 
 
98Wyatt, supra note 20. 
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Congress and others, the Smithsonian has stated that the agreement will not 
restrict public access to Smithsonian resources, only commercial use of those 
resources.99  The Smithsonian also entered to an agreement with 
HarperCollins to publish "Smithsonian Books" in areas such as science, 
American history, and design.100    
 
In 1998, the University of California at Berkeley and Novartis, a 
multinational pharmaceutical company, entered into a five-year agreement 
under which Novartis gave UC Berkeley $25 million to fund basic research 
at a department in the College of National Resources.  Berkeley granted 
Novartis first refusal rights on approximately one-third of the department's 
discoveries and two of five seats on the departmental research committee, 
which determines how the money will be spent.  The agreement gave the 
faculty access to Novartis's proprietary genomic data base if they agreed to 
sign a confidentiality provision requiring them to keep the information 
secret.101  The UC-Novartis joint venture was contractual and did not 
involve the creation of a separate entity.  This is a unique example of a 
technology sharing alliance between a research university and a for-profit 
company. 
 
In 2003, the National Wildlife Federation and Home Depot entered into a 
multifaceted agreement under which Home Depot stores will offer selected 
products (e.g., jugs of Pro's Choice Wild Bird Mix and bird feeders designed 
to keep out bird-eating snakes) bearing the Federation's logo.  The 
Federation reportedly earns a portion of the proceeds from the sale of 
products and an annual fee for its part in other joint promotions that Home 
Depot uses to persuade customers of its commitment to the environment.  
The Federation also received a grant from Home Depot's corporate 
 
99Oversight Hearing on the Smithsonian Business Ventures: Hearing Before House Comm. on House 
Administration, 109th Cong. (2006)(testimony of Lawrence M. Small), available at 
http://cha.house.gov/hearings/Testimony.aspx?TID=765. 
 
100See Harper Collins press release, Feb. 10, 2005, available at 
http://www.harpercollins.com/press/display.asp?ACT=showid&ID=321. 
 
101The Berkeley-Novartis deal has been widely reported.  See, e.g., Press & Washburn, supra note 12.  For the 
contract and an external review by Michigan State University, see 
http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/07/NovartisAgreement_public.pdf (the agreement), and 
http://www.berkeley.edu/news/media/releases/2004/07/external_novartis_review.pdf (the external review).  
In July 2005, UC Berkeley entered into an alliance with Yahoo to operate a research lab near the Berkeley 
campus.  Verne Kopytoff, Yahoo Cements UC Partnership, S.F. Chronicle, July 15, 2005, at C1. For other 
commercial collaborations in the UC system, see WASHBURN, supra note 12, at 17-23; BOK, supra note 12, at 
151-152.  For partnerships at MIT, see id. at 35-37.  See also KIRP, supra note 12, at 207-220. 
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foundation.102  Home Depot has entered into a similar marketing alliance 
with the American Association of Retired Persons, a ' 501(c)(4) 
organization,  to sell products specifically aimed at older adults.103  These 
are examples of licensing, marketing, and corporate sponsorship 
agreements. 
 
 C.  The IRS=s View of Joint Ventures 
  The IRS's initial position was that a charity could not qualify for ' 501(c)(3) 
exemption if it served as a general partner in a joint venture with for-profit limited 
partners because of the conflict between its fiduciary duty to maximize profit for the for-
profit partners and adherence to its tax-exempt mission and the possibility that the 
unlimited liability of the nonprofit general partner exposed its charitable assets while 
protecting the private investors.104  In Plumstead Theatre Society, Inc. v. Commissioner,105 
the Tax Court rejected the Service's noncharitable per se rule.  After Plumstead, the IRS 
reconsidered, announcing that joint ventures would be evaluated by asking two questions: 
(1) does the charity's participation in the joint venture further its exempt purposes (the 
"charitable purpose" test), and (2) does the legal structure of the joint venture permit the 
charity to operate exclusively for exempt purposes and not for an impermissible private 
benefit (the "private benefit" test).106  If the answer to either question was "no," exemption 
was denied.  In most cases, the charitable purpose test was met without great difficulty.  
The greater hurdle was the private benefit limitation, which was grounded in the IRS's 
concern that joint ventures created a potential conflict of interest between maximizing 
 
102See Schwinn, supra note 21. 
 
103See, e.g., Eric Dash, AARP Agrees to Endorse Home Depot Products, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2004, at C10. 
AARP, a ' 501(c)(4) organization, has numerous other marketing deals for products ranging from elder-
friendly cell phones and luggage to health insurance and even motorcycle insurance.  See Claudia H. 
Deutsch, AARP Wants You (to Buy Its Line of Products), N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 2005, at C1.  The Nature 
Conservancy has allowed S.C. Johnson & Sons to use the Conservancy logo in ads for toilet cleaner and 
other products in exchange for a royalty.  Ottaway & Stephens, supra note 19. 
 
104See, e.g., Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,293 (May 30, 1975). 
 
10574 T.C. 1324 (1980), aff'd  per curiam, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 
106See, e.g., Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983). 
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investment return for the private investors and the organization's exempt mission.  For this 
purpose, the structural details often were determinative.  Many private rulings required 
partnership agreements to include sufficient protections to ensure the charitable character 
of the activity.  Later rulings were more permissive, looking not so much to structural 
safeguards as to the presence or absence of direct or indirect economic benefits to the 
limited partners, as evidenced by disproportionate allocations of profits and losses, 
nominal capital contributions by the limited partners, and the charity's assumption of all 
the risk or liability for partnership losses.107   
The Service=s two-part test was criticized as unduly rigid.  One complaint was that 
partnerships and LLCs are separate legal entities and, like corporate subsidiaries, they 
should not in themselves jeopardize an organization's exemption absent other negative 
factors, such as inurement of private gain. A second was that the Acommercial@ nature of a 
partnership should not adversely affect qualification for exemption when that same 
activity, if conducted directly by the organization without taxable partners, would not 
have been a problem because, for example, it was consistent with or substantially related 
to the organization's exempt purposes.  And even if the joint venture activity was an 
unrelated business, so the argument went, that only should expose the nonprofit partner 
to the UBIT, not loss of exemption, if the organization's primary purpose remained 
charitableCe.g., if it had a significant grantmaking program or other charitable activities 
that were commensurate in scope with its financial resources. 
 D.  Whole Activity Joint Ventures   
Beginning in the late 1990s, the IRS's approach to joint venture structures was 
shaped by a handful of whole hospital joint venture transactions that are not particularly 
representative of the larger phenomenon.  Whole hospital joint ventures were pioneered 
by Columbia/HCA, a for-profit health care giant, aided by its financial engineers at 
boutique investment banks.  In the prototype transaction, a nonprofit hospital joined 
forces with a for-profit firm (often an affiliate of HCA/Columbia) to form a limited 
partnership or LLC.  The hospital contributed all of its assets (e.g., an acute care hospital) 
 
107See, e.g., Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,732 (May 19, 1988). 
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and the for-profit would contribute capital, primarily cash and possibly some operating 
assets, and when the smoke cleared the parties emerged with interests in the new entity 
that were proportionate to the negotiated values of the assets contributed by each.  
Regardless of the economic interests, each party usually had equal representation on the 
governing board and the for-profit firm had day-to-day management authority over the 
hospital.  The ' 501(c)(3) organization remained alive, owning its interest in the joint 
venture entity and using any cash distributions for grantmaking or, in rarer cases, other 
charitable activities such as research. 
In structuring a typical whole hospital joint venture, use of a partnership or LLC 
was critical for the tax-exempt partner to retain its public charity status.  If the venture 
were incorporated and the nonprofit partner held its interest as corporate stock, it likely 
would be reclassified as a private foundation and, worse still, private foundation status 
would force it to divest its stake in the hospital under the ' 4943 excess business holdings 
rules.  By structuring the joint venture as a pass-through entity, the activities of the 
hospital were attributed to the nonprofit partner under an aggregate theory, and the 
nonprofit partner continued to enjoy "hospital@ status, enabling it to remain a public 
charity without having to demonstrate any broad public support108 if the hospital 
continued to satisfy the exceedingly loose community benefit standard for health care 
providers. 
Whole hospital joint ventures were a response to rapid market forces in the health 
care sector, the decline of the traditional community hospital, and a shift from "fee-for-
service" to "managed care" financing mechanisms.  These pressures forced many nonprofit 
hospitals to form alliances, first with private physicians and clinics and later with larger 
for-profit hospital systems. The most extreme step was the conversion transaction, in 
which a nonprofit hospital was acquired by a for-profit firm.  Whole hospital joint 
ventures were viewed as a more palatable alternative for nonprofit hospitals who needed 
 
108I.R.C. '' 509(a)(1); 170(b)(1)(A)(iii).  The IRS's position is that under an aggregate theory (which treats a 
partnership as an aggregate of its partners rather than an entity), the activities of a partnership are attributed 
to a nonprofit partner for purposes of determining qualification for tax exemption and liability for the 
unrelated business income tax.  
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to affiliate with a larger system in order to survive but balked at an outright sale or 
conversion.  A stated goal was preservation, albeit in altered form, of the cherished 
community benefit and the accompanying tax exemption under ' 501(c)(3).  Proponents 
argued that the economies of scale and greater access to more cost-efficient managed care 
contracts was critical to survival of the nonprofit hospital and its charitable mission.  
Charitability would be protected by a shared governance structure and provisions in the 
joint venture agreement requiring adherence to the ' 501(c)(3) community benefit 
standard through such factors as an open emergency room, open medical staff, community 
board, nondiscriminatory treatment of Medicare and Medicaid patients, and (possibly) 
some charity care, research and teaching activities.109  The for-profit firm also expected to 
come out a winner B why else would it enter into such a transaction if it did not expect to 
make a profit?  The prototype transaction enabled the for-profit partner to obtain day-to-
day control over an entire hospital for a capital contribution equal to not more than half 
(and usually less) than its true fair market value.  The desired result was increased market 
share and all the accompanying economic advantages and growth opportunities, as well as 
leveraging the halo of a nonprofit hospital with a familiar name and a longstanding 
reputation in the community. 
The case for favorable tax treatment for whole hospital joint ventures was 
effectively deconstructed by VHA, a large and diverse nationwide health care provider 
alliance in a 1996 letter to the Treasury and IRS.  VHA asserted that whole hospital joint 
ventures failed to advance a charitable purpose and should result in revocation of the 
nonprofit partner's exemption for three reasons: (1) the nonprofit partner's influence over 
future hospital operations would be too attenuated to guarantee that the venture would 
advance charitable purposes (i.e., despite 50:50 board representation, the nonprofit's 
power would be weak in practical terms; the for-profit partner would manage the hospital 
and its staff gradually would shift loyalty to profit margins rather than community 
concerns); (2) the community benefit test, when transported to a situation where the for-
 
109See, e.g., Cain Brothers, Focus on Joint Ventures Agreements, 12 STRATEGIES IN CAPITAL FINANCE 2 (Spring 
1995). 
 39 
                                           
profit partner had effective control of the hospital, was inadequate to ensure "maintenance 
of a charitable focus;" and (3) the private benefits derived by the for-profit partner would 
be more than incidental compared with the community benefits.110  The VHA submission 
emphasized that an IRS endorsement of whole hospital joint ventures where the nonprofit 
partner lacked both legal and practical control would lead to a further erosion of the 
community benefit standard and cause a major diversion of charitable assets to private 
parties whose natural instincts and fiduciary duty to their shareholders would cause them 
to exploit these assets for private ends.111  
Revenue Ruling 98-15112, the IRS's first published ruling on joint ventures, was 
responsive to these concerns.  A typical model of IRS caution, the ruling employed "good" 
and "bad" examples of whole hospital joint ventures and avoided any analysis of ancillary 
joint ventures.  In each "situation," a nonprofit corporation owned and operated an acute 
care hospital that had been recognized as a tax-exempt public charity under ' 501(c)(3).  
The for-profit partner was a corporation that owned and operated a number of hospitals 
and, in Situation 2, it provided management services to hospitals that it did not own.  The 
nonprofit, concluding that it could "better serve its community" by obtaining additional 
funding, formed a limited liability company with the for-profit corporation, contributing 
all of its operating assets (including a hospital)  The for-profit firm contributed "assets" 
(presumably, cash, although the ruling is not explicit on this point).  Each partner received 
ownership interests in the LLC proportional and equal in value to its respective 
contributions.  The nonprofit partner intended to use any distributions from the LLC to 
fund grants to support activities that promote community health and to help the indigent 
obtain health care.  This grantmaking program and its participation as an owner of the 
LLC were the nonprofit's only activities.   
 
110Robert A. Boisture & Albert G. Lauber, Jr., Letter to Donald C. Lubick, Asst. Treas. Sect'y for Tax Policy 
and Marcus Owens, Director, IRS Exempt Organizations Division, Dec. 12, 1996, reprinted in 16 EXEMPT 




1121998-1 C.B. 718. 
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A useful way to compare the differences between the two situations in Revenue 
Ruling 98-15 is to identify the "good facts" in Situation 1 and the "bad facts" in Situation 2. 
 Good facts were: (1) the LLC's governing documents committed the venture to provide 
health care services for the benefit of the community as a whole and to give charitable 
purpose priority over maximizing profits; (2) the LLC had a five-person governing board, 
a majority of whom were members of the community selected by the nonprofit partner 
and who were not on the hospital staff and had no business dealings with the hospital; (3) 
the board had authority over changes in activities, disposition of assets, and renewal of the 
management agreement, enabling the nonprofit partner to ensure that the LLC's activities 
would primarily further exempt purposes and any benefits to the for-profit partner would 
be incidental to the accomplishment of charitable purposes; and (4) the LLC entered into 
a management agreement with a company unrelated to the for-profit partner for an initial 
five-year period and was renewable for five more years by mutual consent and terminable 
for cause.  What the ruling did not say was that this good example likely does not exist in 
the real world.   
Bad facts in Situation 2 were:  (1) each partner had the power to appoint three 
members of the governing board and thus the nonprofit partner did not have control, only 
veto power; (2) the LLC entered into a management agreement with a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of the for-profit partner for an initial five-year term and terminable for cause; 
(3) the management agreement was renewable for additional five-year periods at the 
discretion of the manager; and (4) as part of the joint venture agreement, the nonprofit 
partner agreed to approve the selection of two individuals who previously worked for the 
for-profit partner as the LLC's CEO and CFO.  In holding that the organization in 
Situation 1 qualified for exemption and the organization is Situation 2 did not, the IRS 
applied most of the doctrinal principles surveyed earlier in this paper.  The overriding 
principle was that if a private party is allowed to control or use the nonprofit 
organization's activities or assets for its own benefit and that benefit is not incidental to 
the accomplishment of exempt purposes, the nonprofit partner is not organized and 
operated exclusively for exempt purposes. 
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The message of Revenue Ruling 98-15 was that the legal structure of a joint 
venture is highly influential if not determinative.  Actual operations were far less relevant. 
 Control was the super-factor.  The ruling left many important questions unanswered.  For 
example, was the control requirement limited to "whole activity" joint ventures or did it 
also extend to ancillary joint ventures?  Does "control" mean legal control of the governing 
board, or would effective control over the venture's charitable activities be sufficient?  Is a 
50:50 shared governance structure acceptable if the joint venture agreement legally 
obligates the parties to operate in a manner that is consistent with the requirements of 
' 501(c)(3) and the nonprofit partner has meaningful rights to enforce that mandate?113 
The IRS=s control test for whole activity joint ventures has been endorsed by the 
few courts to consider it.  The major precedent114 involved St. David=s Health Care 
System, which since 1938 owned and operated a tax-exempt hospital and related health 
care facilities in Austin, Texas.115  In the mid-1990s, St. David's was encountering financial 
difficulties and concluded that it should consolidate with another health care organization. 
 After failed attempts to join forces with a city hospital and another tax-exempt health 
care system, it entered into a limited partnership with an affiliate of Columbia/HCA 
Healthcare ("HCA"), a nationwide for-profit corporation.  HCA already had a presence in 
the Austin suburbs and was interested in expanding into the urban market.  St. David's 
contributed all of its assets to the newly formed partnership in exchange for a 45.9 percent 
interest, and HCA contributed its Austin-area facilities in exchange for 54.1 percent.  The 
 
113See infra notes 128-129 and accompanying text for some suggested answers. 
 
114See also Redlands Surgical Services v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 47 (1999), aff=d per curiam, 242 F.3d 904 
(9th Cir. 2001).  In Redlands, the Tax Court held that the Service properly denied exemption to a ' 501(c)(3) 
hospital's nonprofit subsidiary whose sole activity was participating in a joint venture with a for-profit 
corporation to operate an ambulatory surgery center.  Significantly, the partnership agreement failed to 
establish any obligation of the partnership to put charitable purposes ahead of economic objectives (a "must" 
for a whole activity joint venture); the nonprofit partner lacked voting control and was unable unilaterally to 
cause the surgery center to respond to community needs (its power to veto expansion was an insufficient 
mitigating factor, as was an arbitration process to break deadlocks); and a revenue-based management 
contract with an affiliate of the for-profit partner provided an incentive to maximize profits. 
 
115St. David's Health Care System, Inc. v. United States, 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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partnership hired an HCA subsidiary to provide day-to-day management,116 and an HCA 
affiliate served as the managing general partner.  Each partner had the power to appoint 
six members of the partnership's 12-person governing board.117  The partnership 
agreement contained certain safeguards to preserve the charitable nature of the facility 
(e.g., the manager was required to abide by the community benefit standard), and St. 
David's had the unilateral legal right to dissolve the venture if the partnership did not act 
in accordance with the recognized community benefit standard for tax exemption.   When 
its exemption was revoked, St. David=s paid the disputed tax and sued for a refund in 
federal district court B a wise choice of forum.  After pausing to characterize the 
operational test as "a horrible amalgamation of negatives arranged like an inside joke 
prompting laughter only from seasoned and sadistic bureaucrats,"118 the district judge 
granted St. Davids= motion for summary judgment, finding that the hospital had 
"substantially more control than the for-profit partner" despite its lack of formal voting 
control.  In response to the Service's argument that St. David's failed to provide sufficient 
charity care, the court found that the hospital met the community benefit standard by 
providing emergency care regardless of ability to pay.119   
On appeal, the IRS emphasized that St. David's had ceded control over the 
partnership and failed to meet the community benefit standard by lacking the requisite 
"community board."  St. David's viewed the critical question as one of function, not 
control, and emphasized that its partnership provided free emergency room care and was 
open to all persons, regardless of ability to pay (the IRS disputed this contention), and 
 
116The management agreement was 55 years and terminable only by default.  The manager was compensated 
based on a percentage of the venture's net revenue.  The IRS argued that this type of compensation formula 
gave the manager an incentive to reduce charity care and service to Medicaid patients. 
 
117St. David's thus had veto power, not control, but it lost its veto if its equity interest fell below 20 percent.  
This was unlikely to happen but could, for example, if HCA exercised its right to unilaterally request a 
capital call if partnership debt reached a certain level.  This would cause a capital shift if St. David's was 
unable to meet the commitment. 
 




                                           
used its share of profits to fund research grants and other health-related initiatives.120  The 
Fifth Circuit, purporting to apply the IRS=s control test, scrutinized the partnership 
documents to determine if St. David's had ceded control.  Because it was "uncertain," it 
held that genuine issues of material fact required it to vacate the summary judgment in 
favor of St. David's and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. 
The Fifth Circuit=s opinion included a long list of observations and conclusions, 
which offer some guidance in structuring a successful whole activity joint venture.  
Favorable factors included: (1) the for-profit manager was required to operate the 
facilities in compliance with the community benefit standard;121 (2) the parties had equal 
representation on the governing board, giving St. David's veto power; (3) St. David's had 
the power to appoint the initial CEO, subject to approval of HCA's board members, and 
either party unilaterally could remove the CEO; and (4) St. David's had the power to 
dissolve the partnership if it received legal advice from a mutually acceptable attorney that 
its participation in the partnership would hinder its tax-exempt status.  
Unfavorable factors were: (1) because St. David's did not control a majority of the 
governing board, it had veto power but no power to initiate action without HCA's 
consent; and its authority to appoint the board chair was insufficient because the chair was 
unable to initiate actions without a majority of the full board; (2) because the hospital 
manager was a for-profit subsidiary of HCA, it was "not apparent" that the manager would 
be inclined to serve charitable interests and more likely that it would prioritize the 
noncharitable interests of its for-profit parent; (3) St. David's primary means to enforce 
 
120The City of Austin, Texas, filed an amicus brief in support of St. David's, arguing that the region relied on 
the hospital as a safety net to provide a large share of its health care for the indigent and disadvantaged.  
Amicus Curiae Brief of the City of Austin, Texas in Support of St. David's Health Care System, Inc., available 
at 2003 Tax Notes Today 56-58 (Mar. 12, 2003). 
 
121The court found that this provision secured "some protections" for St. David's charitable mission.  The IRS 
disagreed, arguing that a partnership agreement must go further and expressly require the manager to place 
charitable concerns above other goals.  Although the court found the IRS's interpretation too narrow, it 
agreed that the provision in the St. David's agreement, standing alone, was insufficient to ensure adequate 
control -- other provisions must provide the nonprofit partner with an effective means of  enforcing the 
manager's obligation to be "charitable" (which, in this case, required adherence to the community benefit 
standard).  Query, what would be required for a church or school or other ' 501(c)(3) organization, where 
there is no explicit community benefit standard? 
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adherence to the community benefit standard was to take legal action, which would be 
time-consuming and expensive; it was unrealistic to expect St. David's to resort to 
litigation every time a decision was made that conflicted with that standard; and (4) 
although St. David's had 50 percent board representation, the board's power was limited 
in scope and did not extend to day-to-day operational decisions; as a practical matter, St. 
David's could not overrule a management decision that fell outside the range of the 
Board's authority.   
And then there were the "uncertainties" that dictated the Fifth Circuit's decision to 
send the case back to the trial court.  The court was unsure whether St. David's ever would 
be willing to exercise its option to cancel the for-profit manager's contract without HCA's 
consent or, if it did terminate the current manager, whether a new manager would 
prioritize charitable purposes.  Moreover, although St. David's had the power to appoint 
and terminate the CEO, there were instances cited by the IRS where the CEO failed to 
comply with the partnership agreement (e.g., no reports of charity care were furnished 
until IRS audit commenced), suggesting that St. David's was unable to enforce a provision 
of the partnership agreement specifically dealing with charity care.  Finally, the court 
surmised that it was unlikely St. David's would exercise its dissolution power even if the 
partnership strayed from its charitable mission because the partnership agreement 
included a non-compete cause providing that, in the event of dissolution, neither partner 
can "compete" in the Austin area for two years.  Since St. David's only served Austin, its 
facilities would in effect cease to exist if the partnership were dissolved.   
On remand, the case was tried by a jury, and St. David's emerged victorious.  The 
judge's instructions were based on the IRS's control test and requested the jury to find 
whether or not St. David's retained sufficient control over the operations of the 
partnership to ensure they were conducted primarily for charitable purposes and only 
incidentally for the private benefit of HCA/Columbia.  St. David's introduced evidence on 
the control issue that reportedly was not effectively challenged by the government, and it 
also is said to have presented undisputed testimony that the partnership's hospitals 
provided significant charity care in their emergency rooms.  The jury rendered a verdict in 
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favor of St. David's.  Shortly thereafter, the government and St. David's reached an out-of-
court settlement under which St. David's retained its tax exemption.122 
Before summarizing the implications of the St. David's saga, it is instructive to 
pause for a snapshot of this still-charitable organization's current financial profile, based 
on a review of its most recently available Form 990s.  For 2006, St. David's reported total 
assets of $283 million, most of which was its stake in the hospital partnership, and $29.8 
million in net program service revenueCvirtually all from the partnership.  Total grants in 
2004 were $1.7 million; net program service revenue for 2004 was $38.9 million.123  In 
2006, with $31.3 million in program service revenue, it made $4.5 in grants.  The 
narrative report of activities describes St. David's as a partner in the St. David's Healthcare 
Partnership, L.P., and states that all income reported as program service revenue "was 
derived from health care services rendered to the central Texas community in accordance 
with the community benefit standard of IRS Rev. Rul. 69-45."  Additional information is 
provided about the four acute care hospitals (e.g., according to the Form 990, in 2004 
they handled 48 percent of the total emergency room visits in the Austin area and 
provided $127 million of uncompensated care).  The not subtle message is that the St. 
David's hospitals continue to comply with the community benefit standard and, given the 
looseness of that standard, they probably do.   
The whole hospital joint venture skirmish currently appears to be in a hiatus, 
perhaps because the courts= acceptance of the IRS control test and the other regulatory 
strictures or other market forces have dissuaded for-profit partners from pursuing this 
kind of transaction.  The decision to deny exemption to nonprofit partners who cede 
control in whole activity joint ventures is sound tax policy.  In theory, control is a 
reasonable bright line benchmarkCa reality check on whether the activity going forward 
will remain faithful to its charitable roots and ensure that charitable assets are not diverted 
 
122For a news report, see Fred Stokeld, St. David's Settles With IRS, Retains Tax Exempt Status, 45 EXEMPT 
ORG. TAX REV. 13 (July 2004). 
 




                                           
to private ends.  A lingering concern, however, is that the taxpayer victory in St. David's 
makes it possible to structure a whole hospital joint venture that appears to satisfy the 
IRS's test in situations where control is illusory and community benefit minimal.  It is 
unfortunate that this "wiggle room" provided by a central Texas jury is now viewed as an 
endorsement of strategically designed whole hospital joint ventures where it is likely that, 
over time, the nonprofit's control will be diluted or ineffective.   
When we have a sufficient history and reliable data about whole hospital joint 
ventures,  research may reveal more about their behavior and whether it comports with 
appropriate standards for charitable tax exemption, whatever they may be for hospitals.  
Until then, the IRS is justified in applying strict and skeptical scrutiny.  Then again, 
perhaps further research is unnecessary.  In the first chapter of his best selling book, Blink, 
Malcolm Gladwell describes how the Getty Museum devoted over a year to investigating 
whether a sixth century marble statueCa kourosCwas legitimate and worth its $10 million 
asking price.  The Getty finally agreed to buy the piece and displayed it with great fanfare. 
 But several experts who saw the kouros after it was acquired knew instantly that it was a 
fake.  One explained that he felt a wave of "intuitive repulsion" when he first laid eyes on 
it.  It was a fake.124 
Let the empirical research proceed, if it must, but at the end of the day whole 
hospital joint ventures don't pass the blink test.  Whole school joint ventures, if they 
should emerge, similarly should be met with a wave of intuitive repulsion.  But that does 
not end the inquiry.  Whole activity joint ventures, despite all the attention they have 
received, are the outlier transaction, not the norm, and rules designed to prevent hijacking 
an entire charity are not necessarily appropriate for other types of alliances, whether or 
not they are substantially related to a charity's exempt mission.  It has taken almost 25 
years, but the IRS now appears to understand that a "one size fits all" doctrinal approach 
to joint ventures is overly simplistic and unfair.  The punishment should fit the crime. 
 
124MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK (2005). 
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 E. Ancillary Joint Ventures 
A typical ancillary joint venture was described by the IRS in its 1998 training 
manual for exempt organization specialists:125 
A hospital ancillary joint venture refers to those joint venture arrangements 
where an exempt organization that operates a hospital or other health care 
facility owns an interest in a joint venture with a for-profit entity to operate 
a particular service. The exempt organization, usually part of a health care 
system, owns and operates a hospital as well as other health care facilities or 
services, such as ambulatory surgery center, MRI, or home health care 
services. It transfers the assets of the health care facility or service to the 
joint venture; or contributes funds to establish the ancillary service. The 
for-profit partner contributes cash equal to the fair market value of the 
exempt organization facility transferred to the joint venture. The joint 
venture owns and operates the health care facility or service. The exempt 
organization still owns and operates the hospital facility. 
 
In the 1987 House UBIT hearings, a Treasury Department official noted that joint 
ventures were generating considerable controversy and raised significant tax policy issues. 
 He said the Treasury's principal concern was to prevent shifting of deductions from 
exempt to taxable partners and to uncover violations of the inurement limitation.  
Another stated concern, however, was that (at the time) the IRS's only response to joint 
ventures was revocation of the nonprofit partner's exempt status.  The official 
concluded:126 
This sanction is unduly severe, at least where the partnership activity relates 
to a limited and discrete aspect of the exempt organization's overall 
activities.  A more appropriate result may be to make an exempt 
organization's income from a partnership with a taxable partner subject to 
the UBIT.  
 
This proportionate approach to ancillary joint ventures makes good sense, but the 
IRS was slow to embrace it until issuing Revenue Ruling 2004-51, the long-awaited first 
 
125Mary Jo Salins, Judy Kindell & Marvin Friedlander, Whole Hospital Joint Ventures, FY 1999 IRS EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM 1 (1998). 
 
126Unrelated Business Tax: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight, House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (hereinafter A1987 UBIT Hearings@), Statement of O. Donaldson Chapoton, at 51-54 
(1987). 
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published ruling on the subject.  Unfortunately, the ruling deals with such a simple 
situation that it does little more than confirm the obvious.  In the fact pattern, a university 
joined forces with a for-profit corporation to form a limited liability company to conduct 
off campus teacher training classes with the same substantive content as the university's 
on-campus seminars.  The for-profit partner's role was to provide its interactive video 
technology and handle marketing and administration, including selecting the camera 
operators and locations where the programs would be held.  Economic ownership and 
governance rights were shared equally, and there was no evidence of non-arm's length 
transactions or improper allocations of income or distributions.  The university controlled 
the curriculum, teaching materials, instructors, and educational standards.  The LLC's 
operating agreement provided that the venture could not engage in any activity that 
jeopardized the university's exempt status.  Significantly, the ruling stipulated that the 
university's participation in the joint venture was an "insubstantial" part of its activities but 
in so doing it provided no illumination on how to measure substantiality for this purpose. 
  After reciting all the controlling legal principles,127 the ruling states that the 
university's participation in the joint venture did not jeopardize its exempt status and it 
would not be subject to the unrelated business income tax on its distributive share of the 
LLC's income.  The IRS apparently was only comfortable ruling on a tightly controlled 
fact pattern where: (1) there was no inurement and no improper income-shifting (that's 
reasonable); (2) the joint venture activity was "insubstantial" and "related" to the 
university's exempt purposes; and (3) the university controlled the substantive program.  
The only concession was that a 50:50 governance structure was permissible if it was 
coupled with all the other favorable factors. 
 
127The principles, all discussed earlier in this paper, were: (1) any activities that did not further an 
organization's purposes had to be "insubstantial"; (2) the organization could not be organized or operated for 
the benefit of "private interests" (the private benefit limitation); (3) in evaluating the presence or absence of 
the requisite exempt purpose, "charitable" includes the advancement of education; (4) "educational" relates to 
instruction or training of individuals; (5) the activities of a partnership or LLC is attributed to the nonprofit 
partner in evaluating its qualification for exemption; (6) a ' 501(c)(3) organization may participate in a joint 
venture and not violate the operational test if its participation furthers a charitable purpose and permits the 
organization to act exclusively in furtherance of its exempt purpose (the two-part test); and (7) if the 
nonprofit partner cedes effective control, it impermissibly serves private interests.   
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Revenue Ruling 2004-51 is better than nothing, but it leaves many questions 
unanswered. It does not consider the possibility of impermissible private benefit on these 
facts.  And yet private benefit (among other things) was a critical negative factor in the 
whole hospital joint venture cases. What does it take to cause a private benefit problem in 
an ancillary joint venture where dealings between the parties are assumed to be at arm's 
length (if they are not, obviously there is a problem)?  And what if the activity were 
"insubstantial" and not an unrelated business but the nonprofit partner ceded substantive 
control?  Would it matter if the activity were an unrelated trade or business?  If an activity 
were unrelated and insubstantial -- or, for that matter, if it were unrelated and substantial 
but "in furtherance of" the organization's exempt purposes, would it adversely affect 
exempt status, assuming no private benefit problem, or does that very situation raise the 
specter of private benefit?  The ruling leaves these questions to conjecture.  
To explore some alternatives, consider the following law school hypotheticals, with 
the usual vexing variables and, atypically, some suggested answers.128 
Basic Fact Pattern:  Sturdley University is a private nonprofit university with 
an undergraduate college, numerous graduate programs, and professional 
schools in law, business and medicine.  To further its educational mission 
and raise revenue, Sturdley's business school is exploring whether to enter 
into a joint venture with ExecutiveEd.com ("Dot Com"), a for-profit 
provider of on line executive education. Under the proposal, Sturdley's 
School of Business will develop the courses and contribute its name, logo 
and the services of selected faculty.  Dot Com will contribute cash, and a 
Dot Com subsidiary will manage the venture for a fee under a renewable 
five-year contract.  All operational decisions, including marketing and fee 
structure, will be made by Dot Com.  The venture will be structured as a 
 
128For some similar illustrations and consistent analysis, see Michael I. Sanders, Health Care Joint Ventures 
Between Tax-Exempt Organizations and For-Profit Entities, 15 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 83, 115-121 
(2005); American Bar Association Tax Section, Committee on Exempt Organizations, Proposed Joint Venture 
Examples for Inclusion in a Revenue Ruling (May 15, 2002), 36 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 508 (2002); 
American Bar Association Health Law Section, Tax and Accounting Interest Group, Proposed Revenue Ruling 
on Ancillary Health Care Joint Ventures (Aug. 1, 2002), 2002 TNT 190-14. 
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limited liability company under state law. In exchange for their respective 
contributions, Sturdley and Dot Com each will take back a 50 percent LLC 
interest and have equal board representation.  Income, expenses and 
distributions will be proportionate to the member's capital accounts, and any 
disputes will be resolved through binding arbitration.  The LLC operating 
agreement states that the joint venture must be operated to further the 
"educational purposes" of Sturdley University. 
 
Analysis:  Under a strict reading of Revenue Ruling 98-15, there is cause for 
concern here because Sturdley does not have legal or effective voting 
control.  In addition, although Sturdley will develop the curriculum, all day-
to-day management decisions will be made by the for-profit partner's wholly 
owned subsidiary.  But if carefully structured, is should neither jeopardize 
Sturdley's exempt status nor give rise to any unrelated business income.  Like 
the joint venture in Revenue Ruling 2004-51, this alliance is an insubstantial 
activity and, under the loose UBIT standard for relatedness, it will not be 
difficult to demonstrate that the program contributes importantly to 
Sturdley's educational missionCeven if it makes lots of money.129  Dot Com 
seems to have somewhat more control over operational decisions than the 
for-profit partner in the ruling, and its subsidiary manages the LLC, but 
otherwise the fact patterns are quite similar.   
 
Variation 1.  Same as the basic fact pattern, except Dot Com has a 60 percent 
economic interest but the governance structure remains 50:50.  The result should 
 
129For example, Harvard Business School's "interactive" executive education and research program, operated 
through a separately incorporated ' 501(c)(3) supporting organization, is described on its Form 990 as 
contributing importantly to the instructional program in all sorts of ways (the generic language on the tax 
return used seems to have been pulled out of a form book).  For its 2006 fiscal year, Harvard Business School 
Interactive, Inc. earned $22.3 million of program service revenue, none of which was treated as unrelated 
business income.  Harvard Business School Publishing, Inc., another successful enterprise, also is structured as 
a separate ' 501(c)(3) subsidiary. 
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be the same.  The economic stakes of the parties in the venture are less important 
than the factors of substantive control, insubstantiality, and relatedness. 
 
Variation 2.  Same basic facts, except Dot Com has a 60 percent economic interest 
and can appoint three out of the five members of the governing board of the LLC, 
and there is nothing in the agreement giving Sturdley control over the content of 
the courses.  Sturdley's role is to provide its reputational and intellectual capital and 
provide faculty to teach the courses.  The IRS has not tipped its hand on the result 
here, but revocation of Sturdley's tax exemption would be a bizarre and untenable 
result.  A sensible approach, at least where the joint venture activity is 
"insubstantial," is to make lack of control a factor on the issue of relatedness for 
UBIT purposes.  It would not be unreasonable for the IRS to issue a ruling that if a 
nonprofit partner lacks control (based on board composition and other relevant 
facts and circumstances), that leads to a rebuttable presumption that the activity is 
unrelated to Sturdley's exempt purposes but does not jeopardize exemption. 
  
Variation 3.  Assume the joint venture had the same 50:50 division of control as in 
the basic fact pattern and the activity, though "insubstantial," was clearly unrelated 
to Sturdley's exempt purposesCe.g., a purely profit-driven surgery center that failed 
to meet the community benefit standard or an off-campus hotel operated by the 
for-profit's management company.  This seems to be another easy caseCno 
revocation of exemption but the income from the activity is subject to the UBIT. 
 
Variation 4.  Same as Variation 3, except Dot Com has a 60 percent economic stake 
and control of the board as well as the management company that operates the 
activity, and Sturdley lacks even veto power.  At first glance, this also seems too 
easy and no different than an unrelated business that Sturdley could operate 
directly without jeopardizing its tax exemption.  But does the university=s lack of 
control over this insubstantial ancillary joint venture result in more than incidental 
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private benefit and thus loss of exemption?  The IRS's private benefit argument 
breaks down in this fact pattern, and loss of exemption on private benefit or even 
inurement grounds (absent egregious violations) would be an inappropriate 
sanction.  As Congress recognized when it enacted the ' 4958 intermediate 
sanctions rules, a fairer approach would be to consider Dot Com as a "disqualified 
person" because of its substantial influence over an important (albeit not dominant) 
segment of the university and impose ' 4958 penalties for any excess benefits and 
"sanction" Sturdley through the unrelated business tax. 
 
Variation 5.  Same facts as in Variation 4 except that, in a bold move to improve its 
U.S. News and World Report rankings, Sturdley also decides that its law and 
medical schools each should enter into separate "whole school" joint ventures with 
for-profit firms.  Each school will be operated through a separate LLC; Sturdley 
and the for-profit partner will share economic and governance rights 50:50; and 
the governing documents will be silent about furthering educational purposes of the 
university or the community benefit standard for health care.  Total net program 
service revenue from the law and medical schools represents about 40 percent of 
Sturdley's total net program service revenue.  This is a much harder (but also 
unrealistic?) case, but rememberCwe are simulating law school, so the real world is 
irrelevant.  Sturdley has three separate joint ventures which, in the aggregate, 
appear to be "substantial," although we really have no idea what it takes to cross the 
substantiality threshold or even what to measure for this purpose. It seems 
reasonable that, in evaluating "substantiality," all the ancillary joint ventures should 
be aggregated.  Under what we have referred to as "the conventional wisdom" on 
the permissible level of unrelated business activity, Sturdley has placed its entire 
exemption at risk if all three activities are unrelated.  The law is unsettled here, and 
there is no way it can be refined until the underlying doctrinal principles are 
clarified.  Until then, the IRS is unlikely to rule, and any sensible tax planner would 
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protect its exemption by using taxable subsidiaries for any substantial unrelated 
business. 
 
  Until Revenue Ruling 2004-51, formal guidance was sparse on ancillary joint 
ventures conducted with a pass-through entity structure.  Many would say it still is.  A few 
concluding points are made here to sort out the possibilities.  First, if an ancillary activity 
is insubstantial but the venture regularly engages in a trade or business, the inquiry should 
be limited to the UBIT rather than loss of exemption, and control over the substantive 
program should be an important but not necessarily conclusive factor in evaluating 
relatedness. If the venture is a substantial but related activity, qualification should not be 
jeopardized unless the arrangement results in inurement or private benefit but, once again, 
ceding control should have a bearing on the question of relatedness. If an activity 
conducted by an ancillary joint venture is both substantial130 and unrelated to the 
organization's exempt purposes, the organization's exemption may be at risk unless it 
insulates itself by using a taxable subsidiary even if the organization does not cede control 
but query again why the legal form in which the activity is conducted should play such a 
protective role.   
 F.  Low-Income Housing Joint Ventures 
After health care, the most common type of nonprofit joint ventures are formed to 
develop and operate low income housing projects.131 The partnering of nonprofit 
organizations with private investors to develop low income housing would not occur 
without the tax credits offered by ' 42 of the Internal Revenue Code.132  In a typical 
 
130An unresolved question is when holding an interest in a joint venture is substantial. 
 
131See generally Sanders, supra note 88, at 9-11; Bennet L. Hecht, DEVELOPING AFFORDABLE HOUSING: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS (2006); Marni Hussong, Notes & Comments: Protecting 
the Tax-Exempt Status of Housing Developers Participating in Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Partnerships, 
76 WASH.L.REV. 243 (2001). 
 
132The low-income housing tax credit is an intricately designed incentive, and we have opted to exercise 
restraint in describing its numerous requirements.  The federal government allocates the credits to state 
agencies who then award them to projects that comply with various requirements relating to the income level 
of residents and rent restrictions.  The statute requires state agencies to award at least 10 percent of total 





                                                                                                                                            
partnership, private investors provide virtually all the capital while the nonprofit 
developer, usually through a tax-exempt corporate subsidiary that acts as general partner, 
manages the property and has an option to acquire it when the tax credits expire.133  
Many nonprofit developers are large and sophisticated enterprises, with numerous 
partnerships and multiple subsidiaries to carry out various functions.  A good examp
Bridge Housing, based in San Francisco, which has developed over 11,000 homes and
a typically complex structure.134  
Low income housing joint ventures were impeded by the IRS's myopic pre-1980 
position. As surveyed earlier, the IRS gradually retreated from this early rigidity and now 
looks to whether the nonprofit's participation in the joint venture serves its exempt 
purposes and permits the nonprofit to act exclusively in furtherance of exempt purposes 
rather than for the private benefit of for-profit partners.  The first prong of this two-part 
test is easily met by any nonprofit developer that follows IRS low income housing 
guidelines.135  The second prong, private benefit, can be a problem.  The IRS does not take 
the position that acquisition of tax credits by for-profit partners is impermissible. Its 
concern is that the limited partners, who have greater bargaining power, can dictate the 
terms of the agreement.  For that reason, the IRS scrutinizes low-income housing 
agreements carefully, seeking to uncover provisions that confer more than an incidental 
private benefit on the limited partners.136  This tension between charitability and investor 
 
participate in the development and operation of the project through the 15-year compliance period. See 
generally Mary Jo Salins & Robert Fontenrose, Housing Partnership Agreements, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 2003 (2002), at G7-G8. 
 
133See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 70B585, 1970B2 Cum.Bull. 115. 
 
134See http://www.bridgehousing.com.   Its latest available Form 990 reveals that Bridge Housing had 50 tax-
exempt corporate subsidiaries, many formed presumably to serve as general partner in separate housing 
developments, and two taxable subsidiaries, one for Aaffordable housing development@ and the other to 
provide Amanagement services for affordable housing development.@. 
 
135See Rev. Proc. 96-32, 1996-1 C.B. 717, in which the IRS established a safe harbor to determine whether 
low-income housing organizations are "charitable." The safe harbor provides quantitative tests for occupancy 
by low and very low-income residents, using HUD guidelines on family income.  If the safe harbor is not met, 
an organization may still rely on a list of facts and circumstances to demonstrate its charitable character. 
 
136To avoid private benefit, the IRS requires housing partnership agreements to avoid disproportionate profit 
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protection is at the heart of a handful of highly specialized technical issues that have been 
a source of frustration for ' 501(c)(3) housing groups.  The major points of contention 
involve industry standard requests by limited partners for various guarantees and 
indemnification to protect them from risk of loss.137   
A letter submitted to the IRS in 2002 on behalf of a consortium of national 
nonprofit housing organizations set the stage for a more targeted and taxpayer-friendly 
approach to housing partnerships.138  The consortium proposed a safe harbor guideline, 
first articulating the relevant policies (e.g., the national policy for the ' 42 tax credit and 
its encouragement of nonprofit-sponsored projects) and then providing a long and rather 
technical list of requirements which, if satisfied, will assure ' 501(c)(3) status for any 
nonprofit organization serving as a general partner for a project that complies with the 
safe harbor.  Control over the charitable character of the project and legal protection 
limiting the nonprofit partner's liability are the key components of the safe harbor.  
Among its essentials are: (1) only ' 501(c)(3) organizations may act as a general partner; 
(2) the nonprofit partner may not be founded by or have any other affiliation with the for-
profit investors apart from the partnership; (3) the charity must have a conflict-of-interest 
policy governing all transactions with interested parties; (4) the initial nonprofit partner or 
another ' 501(c)(3) organization must have an option to acquire the property at the end 
of the 15-year tax credit period; and (5) the governing documents must recite that the 
purposes of the venture include providing decent, safe and affordable housing to low-
income persons and families.139   
 
or loss allocations, unreasonable loans by the nonprofit partner, special distributions to the limited partners, 
and abnormally low capital contributions by the limiteds.  The agreement also must avoid provisions diluting 
the nonprofit partner's effective control.  It would be fatal, for example, to give the limited partners authority 
to dissolve the partnership without the concurrence of the general partner, to remove the general partner, or 
unilateral authority to hire architects, contractors, and management agents.  Salins & Fontenrose, supra  note 
132, at G16. 
 
137For the IRS's latest primer on housing partnership agreements, see Salins & Fontenrose, supra note 132. 
 







                                           
A centerpiece of the proposed safe harbor was a list of "do's" and "don'ts" relating to 
the obligations of the general partner to provide various industry-standard guarantees and 
indemnification to the investors.  For example, it would not be fatal for the nonprofit 
partner to advance necessary funds to complete construction if there was a fixed price 
contract with a bonded contractor or advance funds to cover operating deficits for a 
limited period, subject to a cap, and so on.  For our purposes, all these details are not as 
important as the overall approach, which is to permit real world joint ventures to proceed 
on commercially reasonable terms without threat to the nonprofit partner's tax 
exemption; to ensure that the charitable character of the project is protected and 
enforceable; and to prevent diversion of charitable assets by requiring dollar caps and 
other mechanisms to limit the nonprofit partner's liability. 
It took a while, but in April 2006 the IRS mercifully embraced the spirit of the 
consortium's proposal in a directive to guide agents who process exempt applications for 
low-income housing organizations.140  To recite all the technical details here would 
require far more ink, caffeine and time than necessary for purposes of our broader 
inquiry.141  Suffice it to report the following good news: (1) the IRS at last has issued 
customized guidance for low-income housing partnerships rather than importing stand
from whole hospital joint ventures; (2) low-income housing organizations now have a 
basic blueprint on which they can rely in negotiating agreements with for-profit investors;





140IRS Memorandum on Low-Income Housing Partnerships (April 25, 2006), reprinted in 52 EXEMPT ORG. 
TAX REV. 305 (2006).  One aspect of the directive addressed longstanding logistical problems by allowing 
applicants to submit representations on critical matters in the governing documents rather than the final 
documents, which typically are not complete until days or minutes before a real estate closing.  Historically, 
deals were delayed and sometimes abandoned while awaiting IRS review.  Under the new procedure, 
applicants must eventually submit all the final documents and the IRS may revoke any previous favorable 
determination if they are inconsistent with the previous representations. 
 
141For a crisp and informative overview, see Michael I. Sanders & Jerome A. Breed, IRS Issues Guidance for 
Nonprofit Organizations Involved in Low-Income Housing, 52 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 263 (2006). 
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 V.  CONTRACTUAL ALLIANCES 
 A. Licensing 
Charities with valuable intellectual property frequently enter into contractual 
arrangements to license a wide range of intangible assets, such as a charity's name, 
reputation, logo, mailing lists, and technology.  These arrangements rarely create tax 
problems under current law.  First, they usually are insubstantial relative to the totality of 
the nonprofit's activities.  Second, ' 512 excludes from UBTI "all royalties . . .  whether 
measured by production or by gross or taxable income from the property," less directly 
connected deductions.142  The Code does not define "royalty" for UBIT purposes, and the 
legislative history is silent as to why royalties were included in what otherwise is a list of 
traditional passive investment income items.  Presumably, Congress concluded that 
mineral royalties and revenue from licensing various forms of intellectual property were 
among the proper passive sources of support.  As it has been interpreted, the royalty 
exclusion extends to virtually all payments for the right to use intangible property, 
including income received for the use of valuable intellectual property rights, such as 
patents, trademarks, and copyrights,143 but not to compensation for services rendered by 
the owner of the licensed property.144  Even when a charity performs significant services in 
connection with a licensing arrangement, its UBIT exposure can be minimized by using a 
taxable subsidiary or unrelated third party to perform the services.   This bifurcation 
strategy separates the royalty and services income and preserves the ' 512(b) exclusion for 
the bulk of the revenue generated from the arrangement.145    
There are valid business reasons for a charity to license intellectual property.  
Licensing permits the organization to obtain outside marketing expertise and relieves it of 
 
142I.R.C. ' 512(b)(2). 
 
143Treas. Reg. ' 1.512(b)-1(b). 
 
144See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Commissioner, 86 F.3d 1526 (9th Cir. 1996).  See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-38-041 
(June 28, 1999). 
 
145See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-38-041 (June 28, 1999), modified by Privtr. L. Rul. 2001-49-053 (Aug. 1, 2001).  
It is understood that this ruling involved the AARP.  Another approach is to have separate agreements for 
royalty and services income. 
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the risks and burdens of manufacturing and distributing the licensed product.  Similar 
factors influence the decision to license valuable patents.  Although the upside is more 
limited, so is the downside risk.  The vast majority of licensing arrangements do not 
require a charity to devote much of its time to the enterprise.  Manufacturing, marketing, 
distribution, and all the "active" elements of a trade or business are handled by the for-
profit licensee.  A major concern is to prevent the licensee from misusing the nonprofit=s 
reputation, The IRS permits tax-exempt licensors to retain quality control, and royalty 
payments may be based on a percentage of gross sales, but the line is crossed if a charity 
becomes actively involved in the development and marketing of the product.146    
During the 1987 UBIT hearings, the Treasury characterized many licensing deals as 
akin to joint ventures in an active business, permitting the exempt licensor to share 
revenue from an unrelated business while escaping the UBIT with the aid of the royalty 
exclusion.  Even purely passive arrangements were seen as tantamount to endorsements of 
commercial products.  The House Oversight Subcommittee concurred with the Treasury's 
recommendation to tax amounts measured by net profits and arrangements where exempt 
organizations were exploiting goodwill and other intangibles generated by their exempt 
mission except in cases where the arrangement furthered the organization's exempt 
purposes.  The report specifically stated that licensing a trademark or logo in an attempt 
to foster name recognition would not, without more, be treated as furthering an exempt 
function.147  
Charitable sector advocates defended the royalty exclusion as a sound way to 
encourage exempt organizations to leave active management of income-producing 
businesses to for-profit taxpayers.148  Where the exempt organization actively participated 
in production, distribution, marketing or sale, however, a clearer standard for 
 
146See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 81-178, 1981-2 C.B. 135. 
 
1471988 Draft UBIT Report, supra note 76, at 52. 
 
1481987 UBIT Hearings, supra note 126, at 210 (statement of Independent Sector). 
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differentiating active from passive businesses was the suggested solution.149  Practitioners 
with adversely affected clients argued that "passive" licensing arrangements presented no 
threat of unfair competition and warned that taxing royalties would be a radical departure 
from the longstanding policy of exempting revenue from passive sources.  They noted, 
with some persuasive force, that the effort to tax royalties was motivated more by a 
subjective sense that some arrangements were inappropriate or "unseemly" and defended 
royalty arrangements as a means to foster greater name recognition for the charity.150   
If Congress intended the ' 512(b) "modifications" to exempt passive investment 
income, the expansive definition of "royalty" under current law seems incompatible with 
that policy.  The House Oversight Committee recognized as much in 1987, but proposals 
to tighten the royalty exclusion remain on the far back burner, and the IRS's track record 
in litigation does not hold out much hope that the courts will come to the rescue.  There is 
no indication that the current state of affairs is creating any competitive imbalance or 
mission drift problems.  But like some corporate sponsorships and exclusive provider 
arrangements, royalty and endorsement deals are viewed by purists as unseemly and 
inconsistent with proper charitable behavior.  The challenge for those who seek to tax 
royalties is to articulate a coherent rationale that goes beyond indignation.  That sort of 
uprising is unlikely, especially since most charities can demonstrate that their licensing 
revenue is used to cross-subsidize legitimate charitable activities. 
 B.  Research and Technology Alliances 
Income from technology transfer and sponsored research is another rich source of 
nondonative revenue for universities and other leading nonprofit research centers.  
Stanford University's Office of Technology Licensing ("OTL") provides an impressive 
snapshot of the importance of technology transfers in modern higher education.151  




150For one of the more thoughtful arguments, see Thomas A. Troyer, Changing UBIT: Congress in the 
Workshop, 41 TAX NOTES 1221, 1225-1226 (Dec. 12, 1988). 
151Stanford University, Office of Technology Licensing, Annual Report 2005, available at 
http://otl.stanford.edu/about/resources/otlar05.pdf. 
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history exceeded $1 billion and spanned 1,500 U.S. patents and 2,500 license and option 
agreements.  In its 2005 fiscal year alone, Stanford received $384 million in gross 
royalties.152  Its most lucrative invention launched a start-up company known as Google; 
Stanford's equity interest mushroomed in value to $336 million by the time Google went 
public.  OTL=s annual reports describe its other accomplishments, including its pioneering 
collaboration with the University of California that led to the 1973 discovery of gene 
splicing and cloning techniques known as recombinant DNA.   
The dramatic surge of technology transfer opportunities for research institutions 
was spurred by the enactment in 1980 of the Bayh-Dole Act, which permits universities to 
patent and license for profit technologies developed by its research team.  Prior to Bayh-
Dole, title to inventions developed wholly or partially with federal funding reverted to the 
government. The technology transfer boom also was driven by factors such as the 
privatization trend, which reduced government support and forced research institutions to 
seek other funding sources; the technology explosion and the opportunities for 
universities to profit from its growth; and the desire of faculty to share the profits from 
their discoveries, as Bayh-Dole permits. 
Under current law, typical technology transfer alliances can be structured so that 
the tax-exempt licensors are not subject to the UBIT.  Patent royalties qualify for the 
' 512(b) exclusion, even when a university accepts equity in partial consideration for a 
license to develop the intellectual property.153  Even without the royalty exclusion, 
educational and scientific organizations have a good case that their patent licensing and 
corporate supported research income is not taxable because these activities are 
substantially related to their exempt purposes. To remove most lingering doubt, Congress 
also has provided three statutory exclusions from UBTI for research income if it is: (1) 
performed for the United States, any agency or instrumentality of the federal government, 
 
 
152Id.  For the 2006-2007 fiscal year, gross royalties dropped to $50.4 million.  Stanford University, Office of 
Technology Licensing, Annual Report 2006-2007, available at 
http://otl.stanford.edu/about/resources/otlar07.pdf. 
153See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-30-009 (April 25, 1998). 
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or a state or local government,154 (2) performed by a college, university or hospital "for 
any person"155, or (3) "fundamental" (as distinguished from "applied") and the results are 
freely made available to the general public.156 
The regulations limit the reach of these exclusions by distinguishing "research" 
activities from other activities "of a type ordinarily carried on as an incident to commercial 
or industrial operations, for example, the ordinary testing or inspection of materials or 
products or the designing or construction of equipment, buildings, etc."157  The term 
"fundamental research" does not include research carried on for the primary purpose of 
commercial or industrial applications.158  In a 1976 ruling, the Service set forth factors to 
be considered in determining whether income from commercially sponsored research 
conducted by a scientific organization would be subject to the UBIT.159 If the results of 
those research projects are published in a form available to the public within a reasonably 
short time after completion, the organization is treated as engaging in scientific research in 
the public interest even if the sponsor retains ownership rights in the research results. But 
if the scientific organization agrees to withhold publication beyond the time reasonably 
necessary to obtain patents or agrees to forego publication entirely, its income from 
conducting the commercially sponsored research is subject to the UBIT. 
The public policy arguments in favor of encouraging research collaborations 
between universities and private industry are well known: they contribute to the 
advancement of knowledge.  But concerns are mounting about the abandonment of 
academic values in this new academic/industrial complex.160  No serious observer would 
 
154I.R.C. ' 512(b)(7). 
 
155I.R.C. ' 512(b)(8). 
 
156I.R.C. ' 512(b)(9). 
 




159Rev. Rul. 76B296, 1976B2 C.B. 141. 
160See BOK, supra note 12, at 139-156. 
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propose that a research university that cross-subsidizes its educational program with 
technology licensing revenue should lose its tax exemption.  The largely unexplored 
question161 is when "purely commercial" research revenue should be taxable.  Any such 
effort to expand the UBIT would require a delicate and highly controversial line drawing 
exercise that would be difficult to implement.  Factors to be considered could be conflicts 
of interest, confidentiality agreements with private industry, and corporate-imposed limits 
on dissemination of research results to the public.  Additional tensions are raised by 
contracts between entire university departments and a single company, such as the UC 
Berkeley/Novartis alliance summarized earlier in this paper.162  An epidemic of Novartis-
like contracts, where one company has first refusal rights to departmental research and to 
license patents, distorts the academic mission of a university and might cause Congress, in 
one of its moments of hyperactivity, to respond with punitive legislation.   
A broader dialogue on these issues is underway, and it should continue for a while 
without intervention of the tax system.  As Derek Bok has observed, academic leaders 
need to draw adequate lines that will accommodate a vigorous technology transfer 
program while preserving the openness, independence, and objectivity that good science 
requires," and "the time is ripe . . . to set appropriate limits and see to it that they are 
vigorously enforced."163 
 
 VI.  LOW-PROFIT LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 
A new structure is emerging to accommodate the desire to promote social 
entrepreneurship but avoid the regulatory strictures of tax-exempt status.  The low-profit 
limited liability company, or AL3C,@ has been touted as a vehicle to pool private capital 
and traditional philanthropy to address unmet societal needs.  An L3C is a for-profit entity 
 
161For one of the few comprehensive discussions, see Peter D. Blumberg, Comment: From "Publish or Perish" 
to "Profit or Perish": Revenues from University Technology Transfer and the 501(c)(3) Tax Exemption, 145 
U.PA.L. REV. 89 (1996). 
 
162See infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 
163BOK, supra note 12, at 156. 
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organized for business purposes which: (1) significantly furthers the accomplishment of 
one or more charitable or educational purposes within the meaning of ' 170(c)(2)(B ) of 
the Internal Revenue Code, (2) might not have been formed but for its relationship to the 
accomplishment of charitable or educational purposes, and (3) no significant purpose of 
which is the production of income or the appreciation of property.  L3Cs leverage the 
attractive features of LLCs by offering limited liability to all participants, pass-through tax 
treatment, and flexibility in creating multiple classes of investments with different risks 
and rewards.   If after formation, an organization formed as an L3C fails to meet these 
tests, its status converts to a regular LLC.  Vermont is the first state to enact legislation 
recognizing the L3C.164  Similar legislation has been proposed in North Carolina and 
several other states.    
The L3C movement is laudable but narrow.  L3Cs are intended to facilitate 
program-related investments (PRIs) by private foundations in collaboration with private 
investors, including institutional investors such as pension funds.  For purposes of the five 
percent payout private foundation payout requirement in ' 4942, PRIs count as qualified 
distributions and, even if imprudent under normal fiduciary standards (and they usually 
are), PRIs are insulated from jeopardy investment penalties under ' 4944.  Foundations 
are said to avoid PRIs either because of lack of understanding, fear of complexity, and 
aversion to the expense of tax compliance.   The L3C model would establish state law 
requirements that mirror the IRS rules for PRIs and obviate the need for an expensive 
private ruling.  Foundations would be expected to provide the seed capital and bear the 
greatest risk (e.g., by subordinating their interests and agreeing to a lower rate of return).  
Private investors would be enticed into the pool with the promise of a risk/reward profile 
that offers a comfortable market rate of return albeit with limited upside.  Use of the L3C 
structure permits layering of different types of ownership interests and, its proponents 
predict, will create a desirable climate for the investment of private capital (assuming any 
 
16411 Vt. Stat. Ann. ' 3001(23) (2008). 
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is left by the time of this conference) and Aopen the door to millions of dollars not 
currently available.@165   
To illustrate a typical L3C scenario, consider this example borrowed from materials 
distributed by Robert Lang, the CEO of the Mary Elizabeth & Gordon B. Mannweiler 
Foundation which, in collaboration with Americans for Community Development, are 
founding visionaries of the L3C concept:166   
A for-profit business decides to close a furniture factory in a small town 
where it is the major employer, causing 200 employees to lose their jobs.  
Keeping the factory open would only produce a 3 percent annual return as 
compared to alternatives with similar risks that would yield 6 percent, but 
this analysis fails to consider the costs to the community from loss of the 
factory.  An L3C could be organized by a private foundation to buy the 
factory and keep the jobs.  It would be structured so that the foundation=s 
ownership stake is subordinate to other investors and earn a Avery low@ rate 
of return.  The remaining ownership shares could then be marketed at rates 
of return and risk levels necessary to attract market-driven investors.  To 
ensure that the L3C fulfills its social mission, the foundation would insist on 
having 60 percent of the voting power and control of the governing board. 
 
A reasonable question is whether preserving jobs for workers in an industry or 
geographical location whose time has passed is a prudent social investment 
notwithstanding the negative impact that the plant closing would have on the community. 
  One assumes that more compelling examples of program-related investments through 
L3Cs will emerge.167   
 




167A few have been suggested by Americans for Community Development: operation of a hotel in a 
deteriorating business district with ability to generate revenue but not enough to attract sufficient capital to 
begin operations or financing the conversion of historic buildings into office or retail property.  See 
Frequently Asked Questions About L3Cs, available at 
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The L3C is an intriguing new Afourth sector@ niche structure that would appear to 
have a limited impact.  LC3s are not seeking tax-exempt status.  They are designed to 
operate as self-regulating private businesses, governed by a board, officers, members, and 
structural mandates that ensure the furtherance of social goals.  L3Cs will succeed, 
however, only if a sufficient pool of private investors can be enticed to participate by 
receiving a bond-like investment return, with perhaps more risk (who is to say the 
furniture business will survive, even with the L3C=s help?),  along with the psychic income 
of doing good.   It seems unlikely that pension funds and other noncharitable institutional 
investors would find LC3s attractive unless they have a uniquely broad fixed income 
mandate. 
 
 VII.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Our selective survey of basic structures suggests that it is an exciting time to be an 
architect for entrepreneurial nonprofits.  It may be time for NYU=s celebrated graduate tax 
program to add a seminar on Business Planning for Nonprofits to complement its rich and 
textured curriculum.   Legal and tax advisors are essential players as nonprofits evaluate 
their options and opportunities for revenue-generating activities.    
From a public policy standpoint, the critical questions are not about architecture or 
business planning but immigration law (and maybe economics).  Should the legal system, 
and by default it would be federal tax law, continue to play its traditional role of 
patrolling the borders between the for-profit and nonprofit sectors.  Or, as it seems to be 
doing, should the law take a more relaxed approach in recognition of the value of more 
varied, efficient and innovative approaches to funding socially desirable activity?      
As warned, this paper has no grant thesis to propose B only a cautionary note.  An 
unregulated and permissive approach to commerciality, coupled with mission sprawl, 
doctrinal disarray, the resourcefulness of tax planners, and the base instinct of greed, all 
could conspire to dilute the unique societal role played by nonprofits and ultimately lead 




                                           
and stakeholders, nonprofit board members and managers need to stay focused on their 
organization=s charitable mission and avoid engaging in revenue-generating activities that 
compromise it.  Every board should have a new officer B the Amission steward@ B to ensure 
fidelity and provide leadership by critically evaluating any fundamental strategic changes 
that may be proposed.   
But self regulation is not enough to secure the border.   In a tax professor=s dream 
world, the Internal Revenue Code would clarify the impact of commercial activities on 
tax-exempt status and strengthen the unrelated business income tax.   But be careful what 
you ask for.  This dream could degenerate into a nightmare unless these efforts are 
undertaken with respect for the diversity and independence of the nonprofit sector.  The 
best approach would be to design measured and workable intermediate sanctions, such as 
those proposed in the discussion of ancillary joint ventures, rather than the overbroad 
threats to revoke tax exemption that the IRS used in its early approach to joint ventures.  
The 1987 UBIT Hearings were a constructive step toward reform of the UBIT, but 
momentum was lost in the face of a lobbying effort by special pleaders.   
The more likely scenario, however, is that the law will meander along, with 
occasional venting from Congress and the IRS, resulting in targeted legislation and 
regulations aimed at the more potentially abusive structures and situations, such as whole 
hospital joint ventures, credit counseling organizations, and use of charities as tax shelter 
facilitators.   Or, considering the stock market declines during the too short time that this 
paper was being written,168 perhaps the topics of commerciality and social enterprise will 
wither and become dormant while the for-profit sector enters rehab, with the timing of its 




168As someone once said, if I had more time, I would have written a shorter paper.    
